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INTRODUCTION

The problem of treaty enforcement is as old as international law itself.' For multilateral environmental agreements, however, the need to
police treaty commitments has gained greater attention because of the
increased importance of the subject matter: pressing global environmental problems as varied as ozone depletion, global climate change,
loss of biodiversity, and the international trade in hazardous wastes. Unfortunately, the problem has remained generally intractable. Some
specialized treaty systems, such as the World Trade Organization, have
1.
BENJAMIN

For a documentary study of the enforcement problem in international law, see I & 2
B. FERENCZ, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL LAW-A WAY TO WORLD PEACE: A

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY AND ANALYSIS

(1983).

For a survey of sanction devices of the past,

83-195 (1934) (invoking
heavenly punishment, use of hostages, self-help, and third-party guarantees). See also ROYAL
see PAYSON S. WILD, JR., SANCTIONS AND TREATY ENFORCEMENT
INST. OF INT'L AFFAIRS, SANCTIONS:

THEIR APPLICATION (2d ed. 1935).

THE CHARACTER OF INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS AND
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been able to create apparently effective enforcement mechanisms. None
has created a comprehensive solution to the problem, however, especially not one readily applicable to multilateral environmental
agreements. The contemporary reality remains that the vast majority of
treaty violations go unanswered by the international community.
In the environmental field, attention has focused on the proactive
management of treaty compliance and the use of noncoercive mechanisms.2 The noncompliance process of the Montreal Protocol on OzoneDepleting Substances and the citizen submissions process of the North
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation reflect such efforts.
3
The long-term success of these approaches remains to be seen. Nevertheless, two of their most prominent proponents, Antonia Handler
Chayes and the late Abram Chayes, went as far as to claim that "[t]he
effort to devise and incorporate [deterrent] sanctions in treaties is largely
a waste of time." Given the Chayes' well-known past work and their
influence in the area of "compliance management," this statement cannot
be taken lightly. But what about the effectiveness of environmental treaties and the institutional nature of enforcement?
This Article approaches the issues through the lens of two general
questions. First, what are the functions of treaty enforcement and institutional deterrent sanctions? Second, what are the obstacles to the effective
deployment of institutional deterrent sanctions in response to noncompliance? This Article elaborates on the instrumental purposes of enforcement
as well as its independent normative function. Much of the analysis follows the recent stream of works that combines both international law and

See generally INSTITUTIONS

2.

TIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

Levy eds.,

1993)

FOR THE EARTH: SOURCES FOR EFFECTIVE INTERNA-

24 (Peter M. Haas, Robert 0. Keohane & Marc A.
R. YOUNG, INTERNA-

[hereinafter INSTITUTIONS FOR THE EARTH]; OaAN

TIONAL GOVERNANCE: PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT IN A STATELESS SOCIETY (1994);
ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995); IMPROVING COMPLIANCE WITH INTER-

NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (James Cameron, Jacob Werksman & Peter Roderick eds.,

1996);

ENGAGING COUNTRIES: STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVI-

RONMENTAL ACCORDS
ENGAGING

(Edith Brown Weiss & Harold K. Jacobson eds., 1998) [hereinafter

COUNTRIES];

THE IMPLEMENTATION

AND EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL

ENVIRONMENTAL COMMITMENTS: THEORY AND PRACTICE (David G. Victor, Kal Raustiala &
Eugene B. Skolnikoff eds., 1998); THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
REGIMES: CAUSAL CONNECTIONS AND BEHAVIORAL MECHANISMS (Oran R. Young ed., 1999).

For one examination of the effectiveness of the citizen submission process, see
3.
Tseming Yang, The Effectiveness of the NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement's Citizen Submission Process: A Case Study of Metales y Derivados, 76 U. CoLo. L. REV. 443 (2005).
CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 2, at 2. See also Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS
4.
BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY

47-50 (2d ed. 1979).
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international relations theory.' These works offer a rich understanding of
the conduct of states and the functioning of international legal regimes.
Part I of the Article first provides a brief overview of the problem of
treaty enforcement, including traditional sanctions options and alternative approaches: unilateral sanctions, compliance management, and
transformation of identity and interests. Part II examines the public good
attributes of environmental treaty enforcement, and Part III then considers the associated problems of generating enforcement actions, primarily
obstacles to collective action, the distinct nature of deterrent sanctions as
ex post rather than ex ante compliance measures, and the frailty of the
normative foundations of treaties. Part IV considers the implications for
improving the effectiveness of enforcement mechanisms and possible
avenues for creating the "enforcement good." Particular options include
altering incentives to engage in enforcement as well as changes in the
value of enforcement actions; promoting entrepreneurial enforcement
and improving the design of treaty regimes are less obvious choices. Part
V critiques the recently adopted noncompliance mechanism of the Kyoto
Protocol to the Framework Convention on Climate Change.
Institutional deterrent sanctions are unquestionably difficult to deploy appropriately and effectively; nevertheless, they will remain
important to prevailing contemporary practice and thinking for improving the effectiveness of environmental agreements.
I. A BRIEF

OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEM

OF TREATY ENFORCEMENT

The use of the term "enforcement" in international law literature has
not been consistent. It may describe efforts to expose and document failures of compliance, 6 various bilateral interactions designed to promote
compliance,7 private boycotts by nongovernmental organizations,8 and
"managerial," nonpunitive efforts designed to persuade and help offend-

5.
For an overview of modem international relations theory, see Kenneth W. Abbott,
Modem InternationalRelations Theory: A Prospectusfor InternationalLawyers, 14 YALE J.
INT'L L. 335 (1989). See generallyinfra Parts I.A-B, II.A-B.
6.
See Kal Raustiala, International "Enforcement of Enforcement" Under the North
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, 36 VA. J. INT'L L. 721, 760 (1996); see
also Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Implementation, Enforcement, and Compliance with International
EnvironmentalAgreements-PracticalSuggestions in Light of the World Bank's Experience, 9
GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 37 (1996).
7.
See Daniel Bodansky, Customary (and Not So Customary) InternationalEnvironmental Law, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 105, 117-18 (1995).
8.
See David S. Ardia, Does the Emperor Have No Clothes? Enforcement of International Laws Protecting the Marine Environment, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 497, 559-63 (1998).
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ing states come back into compliance. 9 This Article employs the most
common understanding of the term, shaped primarily by its use in national legal systems: the use of institutionally authorized deterrent
sanctions to effect compliance with the law.' °
A. The Difficulty of CoercingStates:
TraditionalSanctions Options
The root cause of the enforcement problem is the anarchic nature of
the international system." A popular misconception of existing sanctions
mechanisms portrays them as weak, nonexistent, or otherwise ineffective.' 2 The natural solution is to create new or stronger sanctions
mechanisms. This popular belief misunderstands the character of anarchy and the options available under existing international law:
countermeasures, membership sanctions, and treaty-based mechanisms.
1. Countermeasures: Retorsion, Reciprocal
Action, and Reprisals
Countermeasures are self-help acts that customary international law
3
permits states to take in response to a wrongful act. They are similar to
self-help remedies such as self-defense in tort or criminal law. Countermeasures are commonly classified into three groups: retorsions,
reciprocal actions, and reprisals. 4
Retorsions are unfriendly but lawful acts that would otherwise be
permissible even absent a treaty breach. 5 In response to a state's violation of its obligations under an international trade agreement, for

See GUnther Handl, Compliance Control Mechanisms and International Environ9.
mental Obligations, 5 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 29 (1997) (discussing how to "fine-tune"
enforcement). For an even broader usage of the term, see Alfred P. Rubin, Enforcing the Rules
of InternationalLaw, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 149, 149-161 (1993).
See W. Michael Reisman, The Enforcement of International Judgments, 63 Am. J.
10.
INT'L L. 1, 6 (1969).
See THOMAS HOBsES, LEVIATHAN ch. 13 (C.B. McPherson ed., Penguin Books
11.
1981) (1651); see also HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF ORDER IN
WORLD POLITICS (1977).
See, e.g., Stephen M. Anderson, Reforming International Institutions to Improve
12.
Global Environmental Relations, Agreement, and Treaty Enforcement, 18 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 771, 779 (1995); Andrew Watson Samaan, Enforcement of InternationalEnvironmental Treaties: An Analysis, 5 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 261, 273 (1993). See generally
HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE

525-34 (6th ed. 1985, rev. by Kenneth W. Thompson) (1948).
Because they are usually imposed unilaterally, countermeasures can be considered a
13.
subset of unilateral sanctions. See infra Part I.B. 1.
14.

See generally ELISABETH ZOLLER, PEACETIME UNILATERAL REMEDIES: AN ANALY-

SIS OF COUNTERMEASURES (1984).

15.

See id. at 5. Retorsions exclude reciprocal acts.
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example, the injured parties could suspend unrelated discretionary economic aid. 16
Reciprocal actions consist, as their name suggests, of acts of reciprocal noncompliance-a reciprocal breach of the treaty obligation.' 7 For
example, a state that imposes import tariffs in violation of its obligations
under an international free trade agreement may face the reciprocal suspension of tariff concessions by other treaty parties.
Finally, reprisals (also termed retaliation) are more serious responses
to noncompliance. Reprisals ordinarily would not be permissible under
international law, but they become lawful by virtue of the initial treaty
breach. To qualify as reprisals, the acts must be "necessary to terminate
8
the violation[, to] prevent further violation, or to remedy the violation."'
They also must not be "out of proportion to the violation and the injury
suffered."' 9 Internationally, states have resorted to economic sanctions or
asset freezes as forms of reprisals.
In multilateral settings, retorsion and reciprocal action remedies are
usually weak forms of sanctions. Given that retorsions are legal in all
settings, their punitive effects are often insignificant. Reciprocal actions
are usually ineffective when treaty compliance advances some common
good. For environmental treaties, reciprocal noncompliance exacerbates
the initial treaty breach by leading to more environmental harm. For human rights obligations, reciprocal violations are not only impermissible,
but also unthinkable. Reprisals, by contrast, can have greater coercive
effect. As a practical matter, however, they are available and can be used
effectively only by the powerful because of the potential for retaliation.
2. Membership Sanctions
Membership sanctions involve the suspension of membership privileges in response to noncompliance, for example, the right to vote and to

16.
STATES

See, e.g.,

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

§ 905 cmt. a (1987).

17.
They may be accomplished through suspension or termination of the treaty in
whole or in part. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 60, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 637 [hereinafter VCLT]. See also MOHAMMED M. GOMAA, SUSPENSION OR TERMINATION OF TREATIES ON GROUNDS OF BREACH (1996); John K. Setear,
Responses to Breach of a Treaty and RationalistInternationalRelations Theory: The Rules of
Release and Remediation in the Law of Treaties and the Law of State Responsibility, 83 VA. L.
REV. 1 (1997).
18.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 905(1) (1987).
19.
Id.; see also Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Sloyak.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 52-57 (Sept. 25).
20.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 905 cmt. b (1987).
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2
participate in governance, or even membership status itself. ' When
membership comes with valuable benefits, such sanctions can be a
credible deterrent. For example, expulsion from the World Trade Organization would lead to the loss of valuable trade privileges and other
preferential economic treatment. For many multilateral treaties, however,
membership termination is an ineffective sanction. Such treaties call on
states to take on affirmative and sometimes onerous obligations, ranging
from reducing pollution to protecting human rights. Expulsion releases
the target country from the treaty's burdens and harms the treaty system
22
further by exacerbating the initial breach.

3. Treaty-Based Mechanisms: Bilateral and Collective Sanctions
Treaty-based mechanisms include both bilateral and collective sanctioning mechanisms. As with countermeasures, the coerciveness of
treaty-based mechanisms varies greatly. Bilateral enforcement mecha-21
settlement mechanisms.
nisms consist largely of state-to-state dispute
The best known of such processes, that of the GATT/WTO, allows for
2
the imposition of trade sanctions upon a finding of noncompliance.
2 Most
Sanctions must be formally approved before they can be imposed.
26
older environmental treaties lack dispute settlement provisions, but in
contemporary treaty-making practice, bilateral dispute settlement provisions are widespread. Still, they usually lack explicit authority for

See, e.g., Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 11 (1994);
21.
Steve Charnovitz, Rethinking WTO Trade Sanctions, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 792, 827 (2001).
Voluntary withdrawal can be a converse sanction if the institution is heavily de22.
pendent on the support of one or a few individual states. See generally CHAYES & CHAYES,
supra note 2, at 29-108.
For a discussion of supranational adjudication, which resembles bilateral mecha23.
nisms because it utilizes an arbitral/judicial format, see Laurence R. Heifer & Anne-Marie
Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273
(1997). See also Part IV.A.2 infra.
See, e.g., Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
24.
Disputes art. 22, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1143, (1994);
North American Free Trade Agreement art. 2019, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M.
289 (1993). The WTO refers to the suspension of concessions or other obligations rather than
explicit "trade sanctions." See also North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
arts. 34-36, annexes 34, 36A & 36B, Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480.
The mechanism has been actively used for over 300 trade cases since its re25.
inception in 1995. See World Trade Organization, Dispute Settlement-Chronological List of
Disputes Cases, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-.e/dispu -e/dispustatus-e.htm.
See PATRICIA BIRNIE & ALAN E. BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVI26.
RONMENT 180 (1992).
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imposing binding consequences.27 Dispute resolution relies instead on
2
mediation, conciliation, and nonbinding arbitration.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the bilateral mechanisms of many
treaties, especially in multilateral environmental agreements, have generally remained underutilized.2 9 For example, within the thirty-year
history of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) 30 a number of significant violations of
CITES norms have occurred, 3' but no party has pursued dispute resolution through formal adjudicative processes as provided under Article
18(b) of the Convention.
Multilateral sanctioning mechanisms appear even more rarely than
bilateral mechanisms. The United Nations Security Council is the most
prominent multilateral mechanism and has the greatest coercive sanctioning powers.33 The number of Security Council interventions has
remained small because of the veto power of each of the five permanent
members. 34 From its inception to 1990, the Security Council authorized
military force only once (the Korean War) and economic sanctions twice
(against Rhodesia in 1966 and South Africa in 1977). 35 Since 1990, however, the Council has invoked its Chapter VII powers more frequently,

27.

See, e.g,

DAVID

G.

VICTOR, THE COLLAPSE OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL AND THE

64 (2001).
28.
Compliance-inducing responses remain available through the use of countermeasures, membership sanctions, and reprisals.
29.
David Victor asserts that dispute settlement provisions in multilateral environmental
agreements have never been formally invoked. See VICTOR supra note 27, at 64.
30.
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora,
Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 (entered into force July 1, 1975) [hereinafter
CITES].
31.
See ROSALIND REEVE, POLICING INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN ENDANGERED SPECIES:
STRUGGLE TO SLOW GLOBAL WARMING

THE

CITES

TREATY AND COMPLIANCE

91-133 (2002).

32.
Violations have always been settled either informally, under article 18(a), or
through actions and resolutions by the Conference of the Parties, the governing body of
CITES. See WILLEM WIJNSTEKERS, THE EVOLUTION OF CITES: A REFERENCE TO THE CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN ENDANGERED SPECIES OF WILD FAUNA AND FLORA

375 (1998), availableat http://www.cites.org/eng/resources/publications.shtml.
33.
U.N. Charter, arts. 39-51. The Security Council may have additional authority
under Article 94(2) to enforce judgments by the International Court of Justice. See, e.g., Oscar
Schachter, The Enforcement of InternationalJudicialand Arbitral Decisions, 54 AM. J. INT'L

L. 1, 17-24 (1960);

W. MICHAEL REISMAN, NULLITY AND REVISION: THE REVIEW AND ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL JUDGMENTS AND AWARDS 704-13 (1971). However, this
power has never been used by the Council. See BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 305-07 (3d ed. 1999).

34.
35.

U.N. Charter, art. 27.
See HENRY J. STEINER &

CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS

PHILIP ALSTON,

INTERNATIONAL HUMAN

651, 662 (2d ed. 2000).

RIGHTS IN
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authorizing economic sanctions and military force more than a dozen
times.36

Even if some of the difficulties of enforcement are attributable to the
weak and ineffectual nature of many sanctions options, the most important problem of enforcement lies elsewhere. Anarchy does not mean that
international law recognizes no power to sanction or that such sanctions
are uniformly weak; existing options can have strong coercive effects,
but their utilization in response to noncompliance is lackluster. Instead,
37
available "sanctions [are] precarious in their operation" because no
38
transnational authority coordinates and directs them.
B. Alternatives to InstitutionalDeterrentSanctions
The persistence of problems with the effectiveness of sanctions has
led to the pursuit of alternative approaches. The three of greatest prominence are unilateral measures, compliance management, and
transformational processes. 39 Each response correlates with a distinct
view of why states comply with international law. Because the theoretical foundations of some of these views have been well articulated in the
international relations field, I make reference to that literature here.
1. Unilateral Sanctions
Unilateral sanctions are primarily self-help tools. Their appeal derives from the ability to deploy measures with strong coercive effects,
sanctions.4 According to realist
41
such as brute military force or• trade
theories of international relations, such approaches are necessary because states comply with international legal obligations only when their

36.

DAVID CORTRIGHT

STRATEGIES IN THE

37.

J.L.

&

GEORGE

A.

LOPEZ, THE SANCTIONS DECADE: ASSESSING

UN

1990s 1-2 (2002).

BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL

LAw OF PEACE 99 (1955). See generally infra Part I.B. 1.
See, e.g., L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW:
38.

A TREATISE 7-8 (H. Lauterpacht
ed., 8th ed. 1955); BRIERLY, supra note 37, at 42-50.
The theoretical overviews given here are intended to be sketches only. For another
39.
overview, see Kenneth W. Abbott, InternationalRelations Theory, InternationalLaw, and the
Regime Governing Atrocities in Internal Conflicts, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 361 (1999).
They are authorized by customary international law if they meet the criteria for
40.
permissible countermeasures.
See, e.g., MORGENTHAU, supra note 12; see also NICOLO MACCHIAVELLI, THE
41.
PRINCE (Edward Dacres trans., Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953) (1513).
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interests happen to coincide with legal norms or because of coercion by
a superior power.4
As prime evidence of the efficacy of unilateral approaches, supporters usually point to the apparent success of the application of unilateral
sanctions, especially trade sanctions, by the United States.43 Yet, such
claims have not gone unchallenged; 4 the case of international whaling is
instructive. In 1986, the International Whaling Commission (IWC) instituted the current moratorium on commercial whaling. Individual states
have primarily implemented the moratorium, as the IWC has no independent enforcement power. The United States has deployed unilateral
trade sanctions authorized under the Pelly Amendment 4 against states
that have ignored the moratorium. Steve Charnovitz has characterized
such activities as "reasonably effective" in curtailing whaling, 7 but others have vigorously disputed that assertion. 48 Dean Wilkinson has
suggested that the politics of imposing trade sanctions, especially when
the targets are allies of the United States, have significantly undermined
the systematic and effective use of trade sanctions.49 In fact, the ineffectiveness of sanctions under the Pelly Amendment is most obvious with
respect to the whaling activities of Norway and Japan. To this day, both
continue to engage in commercial whaling activities, with Japan euphemistically calling it scientific research whaling. 0

42.

See, e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric Posner, A Theory of Customary International
CHI. L. REV. 1113 (1999).
43.
See, e.g., Alan 0. Sykes, Constructive UnilateralThreats in International Commercial Relations: The Limited Case for Section 301, 23 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 263 (1992).
44.
See, e.g., Daniel Drezner, Bargaining, Enforcement and MultilateralSanctions, 54
INT'L ORG. 73, 98 (2000) ("[Mlultilateral sanctions that have the support of an international
organization are significantly more effective than unilateral efforts.").
45.
See David Caron, The International Whaling Commission and the North Atlantic
Marine Mammal Commission: the Institutional Risks of Coercion in Consensual Structures,
89 AM. J. INT'L L. 154, 156 (1995).
46.
Pub. L. No. 92-219, 85 Stat. 786 (1971) (codified at 22 U.S.C. 1978 (2000))
(amending the Fishermen's Protective Act).
47.
See, e.g., Steve Chamovitz, Environmental Trade Sanctions and the GATT: An
Analysis of the Pelly Amendment on Foreign Environmental Practice, 9 AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
751, 806 (1994).
48.
Dean M. Wilkinson, The Use of Domestic Measures to Enforce InternationalWhaling
Agreements, 17 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'y 271, 281-91 (1989) (detailing the history and success
of the U.S. use of trade sanctions with regard to whaling); cf CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 2, at
94-96; Gregory Rose and George Paleokrassis, Compliance with InternationalEnvironmental
Obligations:A Case Study of the International Whaling Commission, in IMPROVING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 2, at 169-70.
49.
Wilkinson, supra note 48, at 281-91.
50.
See Andrew C. Revkin, Japan Says It Will Double Its Annual Whale Harvest in
Pacific, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 28, 2002, at A14; Walter Gibbs, World Briefing Europe: Norway:
Whalers AllowedA Bigger Catch, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16,2002, at A10.

Law, 66 U.
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Unilateral sanctions pose two additional problems. First, efforts to
initiate unilateral sanctions may entail significant costs. The price of
trade sanctions is the loss of economic opportunities. Military interventions require financial expenditures and may lead to the loss of lives.
Goodwill and friendly relations are often another casualty of such a conflict. Unilateral sanctions can also trigger retaliation by the target state
against the enforcer, potentially leading to "a long echo of alternating
retaliations"5 ' and other adverse collateral consequences." Since such
costs can be enormous, unilateral sanctions are available as a practical
matter only to the most powerful states.53
-0. Second, unilateral sanctions may be perceived as illegitimate. No authoritative or neutral determination of the illegality of the initial breach
or the fairness of the response is available; one state's unilateral retaliatory action may, to the targeted country, look like unlawful aggression or
a general breach of international law. Moreover, since only the strong
can engage in unilateral forms of coercion, such responses are subject to
the "vicissitudes of the distribution of power between the violator of the
law and the victim of the violation.' '
2. Compliance Management
Compliance management, a term coined in the writings of the
Chayes,55 describes the proactive engagement of states and international
institutions in ensuring compliance with treaty obligations. Compliance
management calls for state compliance behavior to be shaped by continuous oversight, official prodding, and the provision of institutional
assistance and positive incentives for those at risk of breach. It deempha6
sizes deterrence and arguably finds punitive sanctions unhelpful.
Compliance management is an outgrowth of the institutionalist
branch of international relations theory, frequently referred to as regime
theory. 7 Institutionalists agree with realists that states are rational actors
driven by self-interest. However, institutionalists take the ability of
51.

ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 37, 183 (1984).
52.
See, e.g., MARGARET P. DOXEY, INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS IN CONTEMPORARY
PERSPECTIVE 26-27 (1987).
53.
See generally CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 2, at 88-111.

54.
MORGENTHAU, supra note 12, at 312. See also THUCYDIDES, HISTORY OF THE
PELOPONNESIAN WAR 402 (Rex Warner trans., Penguin Books 1972) (n.d.) ("[T]he strong do
what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept.").
55.
CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 2, at 22.
56.
See id. ("[C]oercive enforcement is as misguided as it is costly.").
57.
See, e.g., ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN
THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY (1984); Marc A. Levy, Robert 0. Keohane & Peter M.
Haas, Improving the Effectiveness of International Environmental Institutions, in INSTITUTIONS FOR THE EARTH, supra note 2, at 399-408; see also INTERNATIONAL REGIMES (Stephen
D. Krasner ed., 1983).
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international institutions to shape and influence state behavior much
more seriously. 8
The Chayes' concept of managerialism emphasizes the power of legal norms. It stresses that, in addition to material incentives and
efficiency considerations, 9 compliance with treaty norms occurs in large
part because "people-whether as a result of socialization or otherwise-accept that they are obligated to obey the law." 6 To promote
compliance, then, managerialism seeks not only to adjust the incentives
for compliance-for instance, by providing economic or technical aid
that can make it easier to fulfill treaty obligations-but also to engage a
sense of obligation to obey international legal norms. Persuasive discourse on treaty obligations and potential breaches, coupled with social
and diplomatic pressure to remedy such breaches, can assist in achieving
compliance under the managerialist model.6'
A number of empirical studies have found that compliance management contributes significantly to treaty effectiveness. 62 In fact, the
Montreal Protocol on Ozone-Depleting Substances, which embodies
much of the managerial model, is considered one of the most successful
multilateral environmental treaties to date. 63 It is widely credited with
58.

See, e.g., ROBERT 0.

KEOHANE, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND STATE POWER:

2 (1989). See also COOPERATION UNDER AN(Kenneth Oye ed. 1986); Abbott, supra note 5.
Compliance may be efficient because decisions "are not free goods[, and
59.
g]ovemmental resources for policy analysis and decision making are costly and in short supply." CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 2, at4.Compliance may also be in the interest of a state
because ratification and acceptance of treaty obligations presumably show that treaty membership benefits the parties. Id. at 4-7.
Id. at 8.
60.
61.
The Chayes summarize their managerialist prescriptions as 1) ensuring transparency, 2) providing for dispute settlement, 3) capacity building, and 4) promoting the use of
persuasion. Id. at 22-26. The detriment can be as amorphous as loss of trust regarding compliance with other agreements, loss of status and reputation, shunning, and public shaming; or it
can be as concrete as the loss of unrelated benefits, such as international development aid or
technical cooperation. For the influence of nonlegal sanctions on conduct, see ROBERT ELESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY
ARCHY

LICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW:

How

NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES

(1991); David Chamy,

Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L. REV. 373, 392-94 (1990).
See, e.g., INSTITUTIONS FOR THE EARTH, supra note 2; ENGAGING COUNTRIES,
62.
supra note 2; THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGIMES, supra note
2; Jonas Tallberg, Paths to Compliance: Enforcement, Management, and the European Union,
56 INT'L ORG. 609 (2002).
See, e.g., RICHARD ELLIOT BENEDICK, OZONE DIPLOMACY: NEW DIRECTIONS IN
63.
SAFEGUARDING THE PLANET (1998); VICTOR, supra note 27, at x-xi; Kal Raustiala, Conpliance & Effectiveness in InternationalRegulatory Cooperation, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
387, 419-20 (2000); Glenn Wiser, Analysis & Perspective: Kyoto Protocol Packs Powerful
Compliance Punch, 25 INT'L ENV'T REP. CURRENT REP. 86 (2002). See generally 0. Yoshida,
Soft Enforcement of Treaties: The Montreal Protocol's Noncompliance Procedure and the
Functions of Internal International Institutions, 10 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 95
(1999).
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dramatically reducing the production and consumption of chemicals that
destroy the stratospheric ozone layer.64
Still, others have sharply criticized the managerial model. George
Downs has argued that high levels of compliance attributed to managerial mechanisms are primarily due to preexisting high levels of
cooperation among the treaty parties.' Compliance thus is not the result
of managerial efforts, but rather an independent propensity of the parties
to comply. Essentially, states are only doing what they would have done
anyway.
The compliance management approach raises two further concerns
in rejecting punitive sanctions. 67 First, noncompliance often involves no
significant adverse consequences, instead triggering positive outcomes
for the violator. Since compliance with most environmental agreements
requires expending resources and foregoing economic opportunities, a
rationally self-interested actor ordinarily would not be expected to comply other than when convenient. In fact, when stakes are high, as with
national security, significant economic issues, or other vital national interests, it seems unlikely that the weak coercive forces of public shame,
damaged reputation, or a general sense of moral duty to obey international law would trigger a response. 68 Is it reasonable, then, to expect
much more than the appearanceof a desire to comply?
Second, eschewing punitive sanctions raises questions about the
credibility of the treaty obligations and the parties' commitment to them.
The risk is that failure to sanction can be interpreted as indifference to
noncompliance. If behavior and responses toward norm violators are
largely indistinguishable from behavior toward norm adherents, do the
treaty's norms and obligations really mean what they say? Are binding
obligations no different from hortatory and aspirational commitments?
A closer examination of the Montreal Protocol's treatment of Russian noncompliance illustrates some of these concerns. 69 The
64.

See, e.g., BENEDICK, supra note 63.
65.
See David Victor, The Operationand Effectiveness of the Montreal Protocol's Noncompliance Procedure, in THE IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL COMMITMENTS, supra note 2, at 137.
66.
George W. Downs et al., Is the Good News about Compliance Good News about
Cooperation?,50 INT'L ORG. 379, 379-80 (1996).
67.
See, e.g., George W. Downs et al., The TransformationalModel of International
Regime Design: Triumph of Hope or Experience?, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 465,499-500

(2000).
68.

See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 2, at 142; Andrew Guzman, A ComplianceBased Theory of InternationalLaw, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1823 (2002).

69.
Montreal Protocol on Ozone Depleting Substances art. 8, Sept. 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M.
1550 [hereinafter Montreal Protocol]; OZONE SECRETARIAT, UNITED NATIONS ENV'T PROGRAMME,

HANDBOOK

OZONE LAYER

FOR THE INTERNATIONAL

TREATIES FOR THE PROTECTION

OF THE

161-64, 263-67 (5th ed. 2000), available at http://www.unep.ch/ozone/
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Noncompliance Procedure has been the primary tool for monitoring obligations for phasing out ozone-depleting substances (ODS). It is based
on the premise that repeated interactions and iterative discourse can engage the violator in a cooperative enterprise to end noncompliance.
The Noncompliance Procedure provides that the Protocol's Implementation Committee (IC) will investigate allegations of noncompliance
and make recommendations to the Protocol's member states. The Protocol supplies a list of potential remedies, including positive assistance to
the violator, cautionary messages, and suspension of specific membership rights and privileges. 0 The IC's usual response has been to
recommend economic aid, technical assistance, or other helpful measures to bring the violator back into compliance.' It has never
recommended formal deterrent sanctions. In addition, the IC usually
monitors the violator's compliance progress through periodic reporting
requirements and meetings.
In 1995, the Russian Federation notified the Montreal Protocol parties that, as of January 1, 1996, it would be in noncompliance with its
production phase-out obligations. 2 In response, the parties recommended international assistance to address this problem and "imposed"
additional information reporting requirements.73 In 1997, the IC found
that Russia not only remained in noncompliance but had also engaged in
prohibited trade of ODS.74 Noncompliance continued through 1998.
S 75 Al-

though the Protocol parties threatened more coercive sanctions, they
also decided that Russia "should continue to be treated in the same man-

publications.shtml [hereinafter OZONE

SECRETARIAT HANDBOOK].

See also Yoshida, supra

note 63.
OZONE SECRETARIAT HANDBOOK, supra note 69, at 257.
71.
See Thirteenth Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol, Oct. 16-19,
Columbo, Sri Lanka, Report of the Thirteenth Meeting of the Partiesto the Montreal Protocol,
para. 102, U.N. Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro.13/10 (Oct. 26, 2001) ("[T]he role of the Implementation Committee [is] to help Parties facing difficulties in compliance by identifying the
additional efforts needed and helping in the provision of financial assistance."). All Montreal
Protocol meeting documents are available at http://ozone.unep.org/MeetingDocuments/mop/
index.asp.
See Seventh Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol, Vienna, Austria, Dec.
72.
5-7, 1995, Report of the Seventh Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol,Dec. VII/18,
para. 1,U.N. Doc UNEP/OzL.Pro.7/12 (Dec. 27, 1995) [hereinafter Decision V11118]. See
also Yoshida, supra note 63, at 135.
Decision VII/18, supra note 72, para. 9.
73.
Report of the Implementation Committee Under the Noncompliance Procedurefor
74.
the Montreal Protocol on the Work of its Seventeenth Meeting, para. 25, U.N. Doc.
UNEP/OzL.Pro/lmpCom/l 7/3 (Apr. 16, 1997). See also Yoshida, supra note 63, at 138-39.
Yoshida, supra note 63, at 138-39.
75.

70.
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ner as a Party in good standing. 76 Russia did come into compliance at
the end of 2000, when it finally closed all CFC production facilities."
The entire process took more than five years from Russia's initial
announcement. During that time, the parties used monitoring activities,
financial assistance, prodding, and numerous meetings to lobby Russia,
but they never imposed sanctions." If the five-year delay does not seem
excessive, consider that Russia originally had asked for a five-year grace
period. 9 Worse yet, in 2000, Russia actually increased production in order to stockpile ODS in anticipation of the expected production phaseout. o Since the Montreal Protocol's design does not limit the actual release of ODS into the atmosphere, but rather limits the production of
ODS, Russia's increased production and stockpiling efforts had the effect of extending the delay of its phase-out obligation. In the end, Russia
ignored a series of stern admonishments from the IC and returned to
compliance on a schedule that it had set for itself.
3. Transformation of Identities, Interests, and Norms
A third alternative to deterrent sanctions is to use transformational
efforts to encourage compliance. Rather than influencing state conduct
through external means, transformational efforts induce compliance
through internal changes-by transforming the international actors
themselves.8 ' Compliance with treaty norms occurs because one believes

76.
Tenth Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol, Nov. 23-24, 1998, Cairo,
Egypt, Report of the Tenth Meeting of the Partiesto the Montreal Protocol, Dec. X/26, para. 3,
U.N. Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro.10/9 (Dec. 3, 1998).
77.
Montreal Protocol Secretariat, Report of the Secretariaton Information Providedby
the Parties in Accordance with Article 7 of the Montreal Protocol, para. 20, U.N. Doc.
UNEP/OzL.Pro. 13/3 (Aug. 28, 2001).
78.
See Fourteenth Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol, Nov. 25-29, 2002,
Rome, Italy, Report of the Fourteenth Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol, Dec.
XIV/35, U.N. Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro. 14/9 (Dec. 5, 2002).
Report of the Implementation Committee Under the Noncompliance Procedurefor
79.
the Montreal Protocol on the Work of its Eleventh Meeting, Annex II, U.N. Doc.
UNEP/OzL.Pro/ImpCom/1 1/1 (Sept. 25, 1995). See also Letter from the Ministry of Protection of the Environment and Natural Resources, Russian Federation, to the Secretariat of the
Vienna Convention and Montreal Protocol (Oct. 9, 1995) and accompanying report, Technically Feasible and Organizationally Valid Time-Table for Phasing-out Ozone-Depleting
Substances (ODS) (on file with author).
See Report of the Implementation Committee Under the Noncompliance Procedure
80.
for the Montreal Protocol on the Work of its Twenty-Seventh Meeting, para. 15, U.N. Doc.
UNEP/OzL.Pro/ImpCom/27/4 (Oct. 13, 2001) (production of "Annex A and B [CFCs] ... [is]
higher... to provide reserves to enable a smooth transition").
81.
George W. Downs, Enforcement and the Evolution of Cooperation, 19 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 319, 336 (1997) ("The preferences and even underlying values of States are changed
as they are, in effect, socialized by the regime to the potential benefits of an increasingly ambitious regulatory agenda.").
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that one should do so rather than because one is forced to do So8 Like
managerialism, transformational approaches reject the notion that only
considerations of self-interest, material advantage, and security and
power affect behavior. However, transformational approaches assert
more actively that values, ideas, and identities influence state behavior."
They seek to harness such nonutilitarian influences much more broadly
than solely through the duty to obey the law.
As an illustration of such influences, consider five possible motivations for an individual's decision to act in an environmentally
conscientious manner. The individual can engage in recycling because
a) she is required to do so by a municipal ordinance that punishes violations with a fine, which she wants to avoid; b) she seeks social approval
for her environmentally conscientious conduct and hopes to avoid social
disapproval for throwing recyclables into the trash; c) even though she
finds it inconvenient and time consuming to recycle, she values the environment and believes that failing to recycle would be "wrong"; d) her
parents taught her the (unprovable) idea that she should recycle because
otherwise nobody else will recycle; e) she identifies herself as a fervent
environmentalist who is committed to living in an environmentally sustainable fashion.8 The recycling behavior illustrated in examples a) and
b) is most often characterized as the result of formal and informal incentives. It would best correspond to realist and managerialist approaches to
compliance. By contrast, in examples c), d), and e), none of the motivations for action can fairly be characterized as arising out of ordinary,
self-interested, utilitarian considerations.
According to constructivist theories of international relations,85 Harold Koh's transnational legal process theory,16 and liberal theories of

82.
83.
struction
Keohane,

Icy:

Harold Koh, TransnationalLegal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 203-06 (1996).
See generallyAlexander Wendt, Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Conof Power Politics, 46 INT'L ORG. 391 (1992); Judith Goldstein & Robert 0.
Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework, in IDEAS AND FOREIGN POL-

BELIEFS,

INSTITUTIONS

AND

POLITICAL CHANGE

3 (Judith Goldstein & Robert 0.

Keohane eds., 1993).
84.
I have tried to set out how motivations for recycling can be based in a) & b) selfinterest (in avoiding formal or informal punishment and seeking recognition), c) norms, d)
ideas/beliefs, and e) identity. They are not entirely analytically distinct. For example, values
are often constitutive of identity. My point here is to illustrate the various bases that constructivists have relied upon to justify their contentions.
85.
See, e.g., Alexander Wendt, Collective Identity Formation and the International
State, 88 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 384, 388-91 (1994); Abbott, supra note 39, at 361.
86.
See Koh, supra note 82. Koh's theory is the application of the legal process school
to international law. See also HENRY M. HART & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS:
BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW

(1994).
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compliance with international law," transformation is possible because
of the socially constructed nature of national identities and interests. Instead of adjusting incentives to achieve compliance as institutionalist
models would, transformational approaches focus on changing the values, ideas, identities, and interests of the state actors themselves. If states
are transformed so that they comply on their own accord, enforcement
becomes unnecessary.
Koh's theory of transnational legal process asserts that international
legal norms, values, and beliefs can be internalized through repeated interaction, sustained discourse, and efforts to persuade governmental and
nongovernmental actors. 8 In essence, Koh asserts that states can be "socialized" into accepting the values and norms of the international legal
system just as children are socialized into accepting a society's values
and norms through educational and other social processes. Specific
channels of action include the work of transnational activists and nongovernmental organizations, diplomatic interactions and discourse,
pronouncements of individuals or entities with authority (such as the
International Court of Justice), and the work of epistemic communities.9
Epistemic communities have been especially influential with respect
to international environmental issues. They are "network[s] of professionals [such as scientists,] with recognized expertise[,] competence[,]
and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within [the] issue-area.' '9 Because understanding and addressing environmental
problems such as stratospheric ozone depletion and global climate
change requires technical and scientific expertise, epistemic communities have had a dominant role in shaping the perception of reality,
framing issues, and identifying national environmental interests. 9' For
example, the advocacy work of atmospheric scientists and environmentalists in large part drove the adoption of the ozone treaties and the
phase-out of CFCs.92
See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 23, at 334-35; Fernando R. Tes6n, The Kantian
87.
Theory of International Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 53 (1992) (arguing that liberal states are
more committed to the rule of law).
Koh, supra note 82, at 203-05.
88.
89.
See Harold Koh, Bringing InternationalLaw Home, 35 Hous. L. REv. 623, 642-63
(1998) (also called "transnational issue networks" by Koh); see generally THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGIMES,

supra note 2, at 23-25.

90.
Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and InternationalPolicy Coordination,46 INT'L ORG. 1, 3 (1992).
91.
See Emanuel Adler & Peter M. Haas, Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World
Order and the Creation of a Reflective Research Program, 46 INT'L ORG. 367, 375-77
(1992).
92.
See, e.g., Peter M. Haas, Banning Chlorofluorocarbons: Epistemic Community
Efforts to ProtectStratospheric Ozone, 46 INT'L ORG. 187 (1992); see also BENEDICK, supra
note 63. Issue 1 of volume 46 of International Organization (1992) is entirely devoted to
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The attractiveness of constructivist or transformational approaches
lies in their emphasis on cooperative and nonconfrontational methods.
Positive measures, such as education, persuasion, and technical assistance, create pressure to accept responsibility for obligations.93 By
contrast, traditional deterrent sanctions can be unnecessary and counterproductive because they evoke resentment, hostility, ard resistance 94
Transformational approaches reflect the adage that one is more likely to
catch flies with honey than with vinegar.
The effectiveness of transformational approaches is the most difficult of the three alternatives to assess. Norm internalization and
transformation usually do not result in easily discernable changes or
quantifiable progress. Instead, such approaches seek to induce broad attitudinal and behavioral change. Isolated instances of treaty violations do
not alone disprove the potential for transformational change.
Criticism of transformation is similar to that directed at managerialism. Avoidance of deterrent sanctions raises the question of whether
compliance is likely to occur when stakes are high. Furthermore, the violator and other states may perceive noncoercive responses as weak
commitment to treaty norms. Transformational approaches also have
been blamed for contributing to "shallow" treaty obligations 95-a persistent complaint about environmental treaties. While such agreements take
on the challenges of serious global commons problems with high ideals
and grand aspirational language, the substantive commitments often include only weak implementation obligations. In pursuing cooperation,
they arguably cater to the least common denominator, and the resulting
treaty may not demand many substantive changes in behavior, significant
commitments of resources, or other inconvenient or substantial sacrifices.
For example, the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change embodied the aspirations of the industrialized states to cut

epistemic communities relevant to various international regimes. Another example is the evolution of the influence and power of the European Court of Justice and European Court of
Human Rights to induce widespread adherence to their judgments. See Helfer & Slaughter,
supra note 23, at 290-98, 309-10, 353, 371-73.
93.
See, e.g., Clifford Rechtschaffen, Deterrence vs. Cooperation and the Evolving
Theory of Environmental Enforcement, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 1181, 1203-04 (1998).
94.
See, e.g., Martti Koskenniemi, New Institutions and Proceduresfor Implementation
Control and Reaction, in GREENING INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 236, 237 (Jacob Werksman ed., 1996); William J. Davey, Dispute Settlement in GATT, 11 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 51,
67-79 (1987).
95.
See Downs, et al., supra note 67, at 478-79, 502-09; Downs, supra note 81, at 33644; see also George W. Downs et al., Managing the Evolution of Multilateralism, 52 INT'L
ORG. 397 (1998); David G. Victor, Enforcing International Law: Implicationsfor an Effective
Global Warming Regime, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 147, 147-48, 152-57 (1999).

Summer 2006]

1149

InternationalTreaty Enforcement

greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000,96 but the parties were unable to achieve a consensus on binding emissions reduction
targets. Instead, they adopted a "pledge and review" process that created
nonbinding commitments. 97 The process failed to achieve the desired
98
results and led to the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol targets.

Alternative models to institutional deterrent sanctions have been invaluable for the theory and practice of international environmental law.
Yet, they also have significant flaws. None of them can achieve the full
range of effects and outcomes that are ordinarily attributed to an effective mechanism of law enforcement. None of them individually appears
to be able to serve as an adequate replacement for traditional sanctionsbased enforcement mechanisms. The next section provides an explanation by examining the structural impediments to treaty enforcement. A
closer look at the purposes of enforcement indicates that institutional
deterrent sanctions are a public good, and establishing them presents
corresponding difficulties.

II.TREATY

ENFORCEMENT AS A PUBLIC

GOOD

Environmentalists concerned with protecting the environmental
commons have long been familiar with the difficulties of generating and
conserving public goods. 99 This section approaches treaty enforcement
itself as one type of open-access public good.
A. The Nature of Public Goods
A public good is commonly described as any good that is nonexclusive in benefit or use.'O Thus, "those who do not purchase or pay for any
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change arts. 4(2)(a)-(b), May
96.
9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 170.
See Daniel Bodansky, The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
97.
Change: A Commentary, 18 YALE J. INT'L L. 451, 512-17 (1993).
See Claire Breidenich et al., The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework
98.
Convention on Climate Change, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 315, 318 (1998).
See, e.g., Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
99.
Strictly speaking, public goods "are defined [by] jointness of supply and impossi100.
bility of exclusion." RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 17 (1994). "Jointness of supply"
means that "one person's consumption ...does not reduce the amount available to anyone
else." Id. "Impossibility of exclusion" means just that-namely, that "it is impossible to prevent relevant people from consuming it." Id. While enforcement satisfies both criteria of
public goods, for many environmental goods-including those discussed by Mancur Olson-
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of the public ... good cannot be excluded or kept from sharing in the
consumption of the good."'' The most common examples are the atmosphere, national defense, or even the system of law and order more
generally. Enforcement of legal norms is a public good because it generates widespread benefits, including safety from violence or anarchy and
affirmative support of the pursuit of individual happiness.
In his seminal work on collective action, Mancur Olson pointed out
that, even though public goods benefit everyone, divergence between
individual and common interests often undermines efforts to maintain
such goods. Since the benefits of public goods are nonexcludable once
created, why help generate them? In fact, since public goods frequently
require money, time, or other resources, little incentive exists to help
create or maintain them. 0 2 "Shirking" and other strategic behavior are
rational and inevitable responses. 1°3 In national legal systems, the state
creates much of the enforcement good through public funding of the judiciary and law enforcement authorities. Unfortunately, the international
legal system lacks general subsidies or coordination of enforcement activities.
B. The Public Good Characteristicsof
InternationalTreaty Enforcement
Enforcement through institutional deterrent sanctions is a public
good in two distinct ways. First, institutional deterrent sanctions constitute an instrumental means for promoting compliance. Second, they
express the parties' commitment to the norms embodied in the treaty and
the rule of law.
1. Instrumentally Assuring Treaty Compliance: Treaty
Effectiveness and Preserving the Benefit of the Bargain
Institutional deterrent sanctions serve as an instrumental means for
promoting compliance. They contribute to treaty effectiveness by preventing parties from shirking their commitments and by ensuring that
only the characteristic of impossibility of exclusion, as a practical matter, is relevant. See
MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 14 n.21 (2d ed. 1971).
101.
OLSON, supra note 100, at 15.

102.

The best known narrative description of such collective action difficulties is the

"prisoner's dilemma." See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott et al., Toward a Theory of
Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313, 324 (1985);
AXELROD,
WILLIAM

supra note 51, at 7-8;

H.

BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW

RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

39-42 (2d ed. 1994).

33-34 (1994);

103.
According to Olson, "unless the number of individuals is quite small, or unless
there is coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in their common interest, rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group
interest." OLSON, supra note 100, at 2.
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parties receive the benefit of their bargain. Greater treaty effectiveness,
in turn, makes the benefits of international agreements reciprocal in
practice rather than in theory alone, allowing states to make deeper
commitments.1 0
Treaty effectiveness and preservation of the bargain, however, serve
all parties, regardless of their contribution to enforcement efforts. In environmental treaties that protect open-access commons, the benefits also
extend to nonparties. For example, strict adherence to the ODS phaseout schedule under the Montreal Protocol contributes to the protection of
the stratospheric ozone layer. Since the ozone layer is a part of the nonexcludable atmospheric commons, all inhabitants of Earth benefit from
compliance with the Protocol, including those in states outside the Protocol system. 05
2. Maintaining Treaty Norms: Expressive Functions
of Treaty Enforcement
Compliance is not the sole criterion for assessing the usefulness of
traditional enforcement mechanisms.' Even in domestic legal systems,
the use of deterrent sanctions does not achieve perfect compliance. A
complete understanding of treaty enforcement must also consider its expressive function and its role in maintaining the normative aspects of the
law.
As constructivist approaches have suggested, treaties are not just
utilitarian instruments for accomplishing some ulterior goal, a common
task, or the exchange of benefits. Their purpose may also be noninstrumental in character. Treaties can construct or publicly acknowledge
shared values, interests, or identities. States often comply with treaty
norms guaranteeing human rights'07-and increasingly those embodied
in environmental treaties-simply for the sake of upholding those norms.
For example, many states require the humane treatment of endangered
species while they are in international transit' °8 because it is morally and
ethically appropriate. Like Kant's categorical imperatives, obedience to
such norms is inherently proper regardless of the utilitarian effects of
such norms. Adherence to these norms is not merely a tool for achieving

See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 102, at 56-57.
See generally BENEDICK, supra note 63.
See, e.g., REISMAN, supra note 33, at 648-49. But see WILD, supra note 1, at 8.
See, e.g., STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 35, at 104-05.
107.
See CITES, supra note 30, art. Ill(2)(c) (requiring the humane in-transit treatment
108.
of endangered species).

104.

105.
106.
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other objectives; it also affirms the significance of morality and ethics in
shaping human conduct." 9
Similarly, the framework conventions on climate change and ozone
depletion identify a common global interest in avoiding the adverse ecological and public health impacts of anthropogenic modification of the
atmospheric commons and the stratospheric ozone layer. The UN Charter can be seen as an affirmation of the parties' identities as peaceful
members of the community of nations,"0 with all the attendant expectations for future behavior and actions. As an expression of shared
interests and identities, such treaty norms delineate a community of
which the treaty members are a part.
If a treaty can be seen as the expression of a consensus on norms, interests, and identity, then noncompliance can be seen as damaging to that
consensus."' To paraphrase Robert Cover, the violator's noncompliance
actions put forth an alternative normative universe."' Enforcement actions are necessary to affirm the existence and primacy of a common
normative community to which all treaty parties belong, including the
violator. Unlike a morally neutral disincentive, such as a tax, sanctions
signal disapproval and denounce the nonconforming act.' They express
the significance of the institution's concern with the norm violation ' _
that the other parties actually "care" about the treaty norms and their
breach. As Elizabeth Anderson and Richard Pildes have stated: "There
109.
See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 199-200 (1961). Cf Peter Huang,
International Environmental Law and Emotional Rational Choice, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 237
(2002) (discussing emotional or psychological attachment to particular norms).
110.
U.N. Charter arts. 2, 33-36.
111.
For an example of the perils of a lack of norm consensus, see Caron, supra note 45.
Cf Laurence J. Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: InternationalRelations Theory and the
Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash Against Human Rights Regimes, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
1832 (2002) (citing parties' disagreement about substantive content and obligations of human
rights treaties leading some to denounce the treaties).
112.
See Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative,97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 54-60 (1983).
113.
For example, the act of recalling diplomatic personnel or severing diplomatic relations is unlikely to have significant coercive effect on another state. It is a common sanctions
tool, however, because of its symbolism in showing disapproval. See, e.g., ROYAL INST. OF
INT'L AFFAIRS, supra note 1, at 24-25; U.N. Charter art. 41. See generally Ronald T. Rychlak,
Society's Moral Right to Punish: A FurtherExploration of the Denunciation Theory of Punishment, 65 TUL. L. REV. 299, 331-39 (1990); Jaime Malamud-Goti, Transitional
Governments in the Breach: Why Punish State Criminals?, 12 HUM. RTS. Q. 1, 11-12 (1990).
Cf Int'l Law Comm'n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts, art. 37 cmt. 3, U.N. GAOR A/56/10 (2001) [hereinafter Draft Articles on State Responsibility] ("Satisfaction . .. is the remedy for those injuries, not financially assessable, which
amount to an affront to the State. These injuries are frequently of a symbolic character, arising
from the very fact of the breach of the obligation, irrespective of its material consequences for
the State concerned.").
114.
See DoxE, supra note 52, at 57-65 (discussing the symbolic function of sanctions); see also Michael W. Macy, Backward-Looking Social Control, 58 AM. Soc. REV. 819,
820 (1993).
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are some things we can express only with deeds, because words alone
'5
cannot adequately convey our attitudes."" Enforcement affirms that
commitment ' 6 and protects the continued existence of the community
for the benefit of all. Protecting and preserving normative communities
can have long-term transformational benefits. If norms, interests, and
identities of community members are preserved or more closely aligned
with overall treaty goals and purposes, voluntary compliance will improve, and punitive corrective actions may be less necessary.
3. Strengthening Conformity with the Rule of Law
In addition to strengthening particular substantive norms, enforcement also promotes a more general norm: the rule of law.' Because of
its significance as a norm that is not only present in all treaties, but also
independently in international law more generally, the rule of law warrants separate treatment.
Governance under law "is vital for the security and well-being of the
complex international community of the present day [in that it ensures]
' 8
the ordered progress of relations between its members "" The rule of
law requires that those governed by law act according to what is legally
right or wrong rather than what is convenient or within their self-interest.
It protects against anarchy, assures predictability and knowledge of the
9
application of legal rules, and guarantees impartial justice." Adherence
to the rule of law allows for the existence of an international community
of nations, as opposed to a true Hobbesian state of anarchy and constant
war. Institutional deterrent sanctions are public goods because they protect against lawlessness and anarchy.
The power of the rule of law is most apparent in the influence of the
International Court of Justice and the United Nations system. Although the
ICJ lacks readily available enforcement mechanisms, respect for law is
arguably an important source of the Court's authority and persuasive influence. Likewise, Jose Alvarez has noted that "[m]uch of the

Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law, 148 U. PA.
115.
L. REV. 1503, 1567-68 (2000). See also REISMAN, supra note 33, at 649; Thomas Franck,
Legitimacy in the InternationalSystem, 82 Am. J. INT'L L. 705, 725-26 (1988); George H.
Dession, The Technique of Public Order: Evolving Concepts of Criminal Law, 5 BuFF. L. REV.
22, 25-26 (1955).
See Cover, supra note 112, at 49.
116.
See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
117.
Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v.
118.
Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 43 (May 24).
See Richard Fallon, "The Rule of Law" as a Concept in ConstitutionalDiscourse,
119.
97 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1997).
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effectiveness of the UN collective security system is due ... to the idea
that when international subjects act, they do so under the rule of law."' 20
Institutional deterrent sanctions strengthen the rule of law in two
ways: a) they ensure that the response to a treaty violation is impartial
and governed by law, and thus that it is legitimate and fair; and b) they
reinforce the best-known manifestation of the rule of law in all treatiespacta sunt servanda, the duty to comply with treaty obligations. 2 '
a. Ensuring the Legitimacy of Sanctions Responses
Institutionalizing enforcement ensures that sanctions are legitimate.
Without institutional control and approval, the appropriate and inappropriate use of coercive sanctions would often be indistinguishable.
Similarly, institutionalized enforcement provides a nonarbitrary and impartial method for resolving questions about the appropriateness and
severity of sanctions, reducing the threat of legally unjustified and disproportionate uses of deterrent sanctions. All treaty parties benefit from
assurances that they will not arbitrarily become a target of sanctions.
Finally, institutionalized enforcement can reduce the cost of sanctions and increase their effectiveness:'22 legitimate sanctions encounter
less resistance and retaliation. In fact, the larger the number of states participating in an enforcement action, the greater the cost of resentment
and retaliation for the target state. Conversely, if sanctions are severely
illegitimate, resistance may be high, the overall effectiveness of the
treaty system
may be undermined, and all treaty parties may be
3
harmed.1
b. Pacta Sunt Servanda and the Obligation to Obey the Law
The rule of law also requires that state conduct conform to the duty
24
to obey legal obligations-the "super-norm" of pacta sunt servanda.1
Pacta sunt servanda is not like other treaty norms. ' Its existence is nec120.
Jose Alvarez, Judging the Security Council, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 31 (1996). See
also Schachter, supra note 21, at 8.
121.
"[A]greements ... must be observed." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 999 (5th ed.
1979); see also VCLT, supra note 17, art. 26.
122.
See, e.g., Daniel W. Drezner, Bargaining,Enforcement and Multilateral Sanctions:
When Is Cooperation Counterproductive?,54 INT'L ORG. 73, 76-77 (2000). Even the effectiveness of military intervention as a unilateral sanction presupposes neutrality of third-party
countries in the military conflict.
123.
See ROGER FISHER, IMPROVING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW 99
(1981).
124.
See Heifer & Slaughter, supra note 23, at 273, 332 n.259 (discussing pacta sunt
servanda as a "meta-norm"); HART, supra note 109, at 228 (discussing pacta sunt servanda as

a "basic norm" of international law).
125.
See, e.g., HANS KELSEN, GENERAL

THEORY OF LAW AND STATE

369-70 (Anders

Wedberg trans., Harvard Univ. Press, 1945); Roger Fisher, Bringing Law to Bear on Govern-
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26
essary to all treaties, and all treaty commitments presuppose it. It embodies the nature of law as a set of rules that must be obeyed and not
simply consulted for guidance.
Enforcement of pacta sunt servanda has an important expressive
function. It signals the expectation that legal norms are to be obeyed
simply because they are law, even if doing so is inconvenient or contrary
to immediate material self-interest. Thus, compliance is not just a voluntary act of moral excellence, but rather the fulfillment of a basic duty.
Stricter enforcement has the long-term benefits of a greater degree of
"international legalization" of pacta sunt servanda'" and a higher level
of voluntary compliance. In turn, there will be a reduced need for future
enforcement actions, and correspondingly lower future enforcement
costs. 128 States might also be more willing to commit to deeper obligations in future international agreements. Parties would be able to address
a broader set of global environmental or other issues in a more aggressive manner, having greater confidence that the mutually agreed-upon
commitments would be kept. By contrast, lack of enforcement can demoralize other complying members, leading them to question the overall
fairness of the treaty regime and thus undermining the parties' commitment to it. " 9

III. THE PROBLEM OF GENERATING THE "ENFORCEMENT GOOD"
If treaty enforcement is conceived as a public good, the collective
30
action and strategic behavior difficulties become readily apparent.' But
two other closely related problems are also significant: the second-order
ments, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1130, 1138-39 (1961). In fact, it has been suggested that pacta sunt
servanda is a peremptory norm of international law. See MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION
TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 65-66 (3rd ed. 1999).

See Jonathan I. Charney, Universal InternationalLaw, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 529, 534
126.
(1993).
Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Values and Interests: InternationalLegaliza127.
tion in the Fight Against Corruption,31 J. LEGAL STUD. 141, 141 (2002).
A safer world with fewer conflicts should be the result. See, e.g., Samuel Hunting128.
ton, American Ideals Versus American Institutions, in AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 241-42
(John Ikenberry ed., 1989) (arguing that promotion and enforcement of American values ultimately provides greater security for the United States).
See Drezner, supra note 122, at 83-85 (backsliding of cooperation); LISA MARTIN,
129.
COERCIVE COOPERATION: EXPLAINING MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 40-43 (1992)

(bandwagon effect). The problem would be especially serious if it continued after an authoritative determination of noncompliance. See FISHER, supra note 123, at 28-29.
See, e.g., Joanne Gowa, Rational Hegemons, Excludable Goods, and Small Groups:
130.
An Epitaph for Hegemonic Stability Theory?, 41 WORLD POL. 307, 319-22 (1989); Drezner,
supra note 122, at 73. See generally MARTIN, supra note 129; James D. Fearon, Bargaining,
Enforcement, and InternationalCooperation, 52 INT'L ORG. 269 (1998).
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collective action problem and the normative foundations of compliance.
Each poses obstacles to the creation of the "enforcement good" and
leads to less enforcement than ideally desirable.
A. StrategicBehavior in Treaty Enforcement

As a publiL good, treaty enforcement must overcome collective action difficulties in getting states to contribute to the cost of
enforcement. 3 ' Loss of human life and financial costs in military interventions, damage to the sanctioning state's own economic well-being
through economic sanctions, and the possibility of resentment and retaliation by the target state all contribute to the incentive to shirk
participation. 3 '
When at least one party has a particularly large stake in ensuring
compliance, the individual benefits of enforcement can outweigh the
costs, and enforcement may still occur.3 3 But that is not likely to be the
case for most environmental agreements.' 4 Harm to the environmental
commons is spread out over many states. It may even be externalized to
states that are not parties to environmental agreements and have no formal standing within the treaty itself. Many environmental problems such
as ozone depletion and global climate change are the cumulative result
of years, decades, and sometimes even centuries of pollution and environmental degradation. The marginal harm from any particular treaty
breach may appear small compared to the overall problem, and if the
agreement is designed to promote intangible or incommensurable values
such as human rights or biological diversity, there may be no perceptible
or quantifiable harm. The result in such cases is that member states devote fewer resources to encouraging compliance than might be desirable
or economically efficient.' If enforcement costs are very high compared
to the harms of noncompliance, as may frequently be the case with unilateral sanctions, no single state may find it worth its while to pursue
sanctions. This may be true even if the treaty breach is substantial and
serious, and enforcement could create an overall benefit to the treaty system and other parties.
131.
See, e.g., DOXEY, supra note 52, at 106-09. The problem does not usually arise in
bilateral treaties since the cost of breach is concentrated on the other party.
132.
See, e.g., id. at 27-31.
133.
For example, within the WTO, tariffs that are applied in a nondiscriminatory fashion on all imports of a particular good usually still have discriminatory effects on particular
countries. Countries that tend to specialize in particular export goods will have a special incentive to bring enforcement actions.
134.
Bilateral treaties constitute a special case, since breaches by one party can localize
the harm wholly on the other party. See OLSON, supra note 100, at 43, 45.
135.
See, e.g., Abram Chayes et al., Managing Compliance: A ComparativePerspective,
in ENGAGING COUNTRIES, supra note 2, at 53. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
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Ultimately, this noncompliance conundrum encounters limits. Iterative processes and long-term interactions alleviate free-rider difficulties.
Lengthening the time horizon and the availability of repeated interactions create opportunities for parties to reward cooperators or sanction
defectors, thus increasing the level of cooperation in enforcement
ac137
tions. 3 6 Social structures and norms can be influential as well.
However, the problem of strategic behavior remains significant. For
example, although participation in United Nations peacekeeping activities may involve a surprisingly large number of states,' 38 such
participation is far from consistent and universal. Moreover, the low
utilization rate of bilateral and multilateral dispute settlement mechanisms, especially in environmental agreements, suggests strategic
behavior remains a considerable problem.
B. The Second-OrderCollective Action Problem: Carrots,Sticks,

and the Distinction Between Ex Post and Ex Ante
Approaches to Compliance

The nature of enforcement as a public good suggests that the structuring of enforcement incentives is an important issue in designing
international environmental treaty regimes.'39 That task, however, is
complicated by the second-order nature of the collective action problem.' °
The distinction between deterrent sanctions and positive compliance
incentives is illustrative. The most common metaphor for the difference
between deterrent sanctions and positive incentives is the "carrot and
136.
See, e.g., AXELROD, supra note 51; see also BAIRD ET AL., supra note 102, at 15987. Martin also points to strong leadership and "bandwagoning" effects as means for overcoming free-rider problems. MARTIN, supra note 129, at 40-43. However, as with unilateral
sanctions, that seems only likely to occur effectively with powerful countries such as the
United States.
137.
See generally ELLICKSON, supra note 61; ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990).
138.
As of the end of September 2006, 70,002 persons from 110 countries contributed to
peacekeeping operations for that year. U.N. Dep't of Peacekeeping Operations, Monthly Summary of Contributions (Military Observers, Civilian Police and Troops) at 2 (Sept. 2006),
availableat http:llwww.un.orglDepts/dpko/dpko/contributors/2006/sept06-l .pdf.
139.
See, e.g., Ronald Mitchell, Compliance Theory: An Overview, in IMPROVING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 2, at 16-19; Jonathan
Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J.
677 (1999); DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 47175 (2d ed. 2002).
140.
If the underlying environmental problem-the creation of the environmental public
good-is seen as the primary collective action problem to be addressed, then enforcement is a
secondary (or second order) collective action problem because it arises only as part of the
solution. In other words, the solution to the primary collective action problem itself creates
another collective action problem. See infra notes 144-145 and accompanying discussion.
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stick" image. It is used to describe the key distinction between managerial or transformational approaches-which rely primarily on positive
incentives to induce compliance-and institutional and unilateral sanctions mechanisms-which rely primarily on negative disincentives such
as punitive sanctions.
But the carrot and stick metaphor is deceptive. Although it contrasts
cooperative and punitive approaches, it also suggests a fundamental
equivalence between the two. Since punitive sanctions are negative incentives, they are easily portrayed as the converse of positive incentive
mechanisms. In each case, the overall influence on the regulated entities
appears fundamentally equal to the other, simply employing a different
form of manipulation of incentives and disincentives to prompt particular
behavior. As critiques of compliance management and transformational
they do not function in the same
approaches have explained, however,
41
way, and their effects are different.'
More important to understanding the obstacles to generating deterrent sanctions is the fact that the metaphor masks two significant
qualitative differences. 4 2 First, institutional deterrent sanctions differ not
merely in their reliance on negative incentives, 43 but also in their temporal relationship with the treaty breach. Cooperative models and positive
incentives are ex ante approaches that seek to prevent noncompliance
from occurring in the first place. By contrast, deterrent sanctions are ex
post approaches to norm compliance that are triggered after a treaty
breach has occurred or as it is about to occur. In other words, the problem of enforcement does not arise until after a party has decided that all
the institutional incentives, disincentives, and ex ante breach constraints
are insufficient to induce it to comply. Deterrent sanctions, by their nature, do not come into play until all ex ante efforts at achieving
compliance have failed.' 44
Second, the notion of equivalence between positive and negative incentives also obscures differences in the difficulty of generating such
141.
See supra Parts I.B.2-3.
142.
Although beyond the scope of the discussion here, Daniel Drezner has pointed to
the reputational effects that use of, and response to, positive and negative incentives have on
the effectiveness of those incentives. See DANIEL DREZNER, THE SANCTIONS PARADOX: EcoNOMIC STATE CRAFT AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 1-6 (1999); see also Daniel Drezner,
The Trouble with Carrots: Transaction Costs, Conflict Expectations, and Economic Inducements, in POWER AND THE PURSE: ECONOMIC STATE CRAFT, INDEPENDENCE, AND NATIONAL
SECURITY 188 (Jean-Marc Blanchard et. al. eds., 2000).
143.
See Karin Mickelson, Carrots, Sticks or Stepping Stones: Differing Perspectives on
Compliance with InternationalLaw, in TRILATERAL PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
ISSUES: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 35, 36 (Thomas J. Schoenbaum et al. eds., 1998); Pamela
Oliver, Rewards and Punishments as Selective Incentives for Collective Action: Theoretical
Investigations,85 AM. J. Soc. 1356, 1361 (1980).
144.
The types of breaches that I am focusing on here are not inadvertent or accidental.
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incentives. Unlike money, the quintessential positive incentive, most punitive sanctions cannot easily be "stored" or otherwise effected in
advance of the need for them. Instead, they must be invoked after a
treaty breach has occurred. For example, economic embargoes are the
result of a refusal to trade goods; such actions cannot be taken in advance or independently of the punitive effect. At the same time, states
have been loath to cede control over the tools that can produce the effects of deterrent sanctions. Making resources such as military forces
available in sufficient numbers so as to constitute a serious deterrent
would transfer sources of national power and security to the control of
others. Similarly, giving regulatory control over commerce and banking
activities to a treaty institution in advance of breach, so that it may impose punitive import tariffs or freeze assets in response to
noncompliance, would seriously diminish a state's sovereign control and
autonomy over activities within its own borders. Thus, providing treaty
institutions with the fundamental tools for generating the effects of deterrent sanctions is normally much more difficult than creating positive
incentives.
Producing institutional deterrent sanctions thus presents collective
action problems that do not arise until after a breach has occurred.' 45 It
therefore raises distinct second-order collective action problems that
must be handled separately from the underlying problems the treaty addresses.' 46 In essence, these difficulties indicate that the need for ex post
norm enforcement cannot be completely eliminated or supplanted by ex
ante positive incentives.
C. The Normative Foundations of Compliance and Enforcement
A third difficulty in triggering enforcement responses to noncompliance can be attributed to the frailty of the normative foundations of
145.
Recognition of this problem has led to descriptions of international legal norm
implementation as two-phased: 1) the bargaining phase, and 2) the enforcement phase. See
Fearon, supra note 130, at 270. The bargaining phase is the stage of international action when
the treaty's norms are initially negotiated. It deals directly with the primary collective action
problem requiring international cooperation, such as global climate change or economic protectionism. The enforcement phase encompasses post-treaty implementation and compliance
with the agreed-to treaty norms, when defections from commitments must be addressed.
146.
See, e.g., Richard McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms,
96 MICH. L. REv. 338 (1997); CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 2, at 64; WILD, supra note 1, at
204. In fact, enforcement raises an infinite regression of collective action problems. Failure by
nonbreaching parties to participate in enforcement actions should itself be the subject of an
enforcement action (i.e., enforcing participation in an enforcement action), and so on. For one
proposed solution to this infinite regression problem, see Paul G. Mahoney & Chris. W. Sanchirico, Norms, Repeated Games, and the Role of Law (Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law 2002 Law &
Econ. Research Papers Series, Working Paper No. 02-3, 2002), available at http://ssrn.con
abstract id=311879.
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compliance and enforcement. Within international diplomatic practice
and the self-interested and security-driven decision-making processes of
states, instrumental views of treaties and enforcement predominate. The
normative aspects of treaties, compliance, and enforcement are largely of
secondary importance. Upholding treaty norms in such a situation encounters two particular obstacles: the proper valuation of the normative
benefits of enforcement, and the associated erosion of the authority and
autonomy of treaty norms.
1. The Dual Nature of Treaties and the Predominance
of Instrumentalist Perspectives
Contemporary discourse on environmental enforcement and compliance has focused primarily on its instrumental functions-ensuring
treaty effectiveness and preserving the benefit of the bargain.1 47 As previously noted, environmental treaties also advance normative goals,
including promoting the values underlying an agreement and the rule of
law in general. These competing views arise out of the dual nature of
treaties as both contracts and legislation. Like contracts, treaties impose
only obligations to the extent that the sovereigns have consented to them.
Like legislation, they also restrict a state's freedom of action through the
newly created legal norm, and hence they require ceding some amount of
sovereignty to the treaty regime.
As contracts, treaties are designed to achieve the utilitarian purposes
between them. 48
of the parties by "creating legal rights and obligations"
Similar to contracts between private individuals, treaties are voluntary
and reciprocal commitments based on mutual consent. The rules governing treaty application and interpretation incorporate many principles
relevant to the creation, interpretation, and conclusion of contracts.'4 9 For
example, concluding a treaty requires both the capacity and consent of

See, e.g., supra note 2. See also Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note
147.
113, art. 49 cmt. 3.
OPPENHEIM, supra note 38, at 877. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOR148.
EIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, pt. 3, introductory note (1987) (treaty law
"resembles domestic contract law, as international agreements often resemble contracts");
1945-1986 186-87, 187 n.8
(1989). See also Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 271 (1890); Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2
SHABTA! ROSENNE, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF TREATIES

Pet.) 253, 314 (1829).
BRIERLY, supra note 37, at 243 ("In most respects the general principles applicable
149.
to private contracts apply."). See generally VCLT, supra note 17. Of course, "analogies from
the contract law of any particular country are to be used with caution." RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES,

introductory note (1987). For ex-

ample, requirements such as consideration do not apply to treaties, nor does a statute of frauds
exist for treaties. Id.
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the parties,5 and it may be invalidated for mistake, fraud, and coercion.' The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade is a well-known
example of a contract-type treaty."12 Designed to promote free trade, the
GATT's primary mission is the reduction of tariffs and trade barriers.
The manner in which most of the tariff negotiation rounds occurred-by
the exchange of various tariff concessions-illustrates the parties' contractual understanding of the GATT. In each of the GATT trade rounds,
the contracting parties sought to come to a mutually agreed-upon and
carefully considered bargain in which each provided some tariff concessions and received others in return.'
As legislative acts, treaties set out legal frameworks that elaborate
commonly agreed-upon norms and create "general rules of conduct
among a considerable number of States."" They are international law.'55
The institutions that they create advance some larger communal good or
benefit,'5 6 often championing ideals that do not directly benefit any particular party, but indivisibly further the welfare of all, including those
who are not party to the treaty system.
The legislative conception is most strongly expressed in multilateral
agreements open to all states.' The international human rights law
150.

See VCLT, supra note 17, arts. 7-8, 11-15; see also BRIERLY, supra note 37, at 243;
supra note 38, at 890. Cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS

OPPENHEIM,

LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

'counter-offer' .... ).

§ 313 cmt. g (1987) ("A permissible reservation is in effect a

151.
See VCLT, supra note 17, arts. 48-49, 51-52.
152.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-I 1,T.I.A.S.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. While the GATr has been superseded by the WTO, most of its substantive principles and provisions continue to exist largely unaltered in the WTO.
153.
See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, UNDERSTANDING THE WTO 11 (2005), available at http://www.wto.int/english/thewto-e/whatis-e/whatise.htm.
154.
OPPENHEIM, supra note 38, at 878-79; ROSENNE, supra note 148, at 124. Brierly
noted that "they do in fact perform the function which a legislature performs in a state, though
they do so only imperfectly." BRIERLY, supra note 37, at 59-60.
155.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES, Pt. 1, introductory note, § 102 (1987). Treaties are, at a minimum, co-equal as a
source of international law to customary international law. See Statute of the International
Court of Justice art. 38(1), 1945 I.C.J. Acts & Docs. No. 5. Cf.ROSENNE, supra note 148, at
129 (suggesting that the International Law Commission's approach to the drafting of part Vinvalidity, termination, and suspension of treaties-of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties reflected an understanding that was contrary to traditional principles of contract doctrines). They may also crystallize or supersede customary law. VCLT, supra note 17, art. 38;
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102, cmt.
j (1987). See also ROSENNE, supra note 148, at 123-24.
See, e.g., PAUL REUTER, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF TREATIES 2-3 (Jose Mico
156.
& Peter Haggemacher trans., Kegan Paul Int. 2d ed. 1995) (1972). See also Reservations to
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. Reports 15 (May 28).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
157.
§ 102, cmt. f (1987).
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system is one of the most prominent examples. Especially when prepared within the UN system, multilateral human rights instruments are
designed to attract the widest participation possible and become universally applicable.'- 8 Multilateral agreements dealing with global
environmental issues likewise exhibit many characteristics of universality.
The contractual and legislative sides of treaties are not mutually exclusive; many treaties exhibit characteristics of both.'59 Nevertheless,
law-based perspectives of treaties-and international relations more
generally-remain weak. Utilitarian conceptions and national selfinterest concerns continue as the most powerful forces in international
politics and the foreign policies of many countries.
2. The Problem of Valuing the Benefits of Enforcement
The contractual-utilitarian model of treaties and the remedies it affords may be appropriate for some treaties, such as international trade
agreements.' 60 Unfortunately, this is likely to be the exception rather than
the rule. Not all treaty functions, including the public expression and
shaping of norms, values, and state identities, can readily fit into a contract model. This is especially true for multilateral agreements involving
the environment and human rights. Ordinarily, contract remedies, such as
compensation or reciprocal noncompliance, will be inadequate as an enforcement response or run counter to overall treaty objectives. For
example, compensation remedies will ordinarily run into measurement
difficulties. Even when environmental harms such as pollution are readily visible, appropriately quantifying them and showing causation has
proven extremely problematic.
Consider quantifying and allocating responsibility for ozone depletion. Accurately valuing the environmental and public health injuries
resulting from ozone depletion would only be part of the challenge. The
task would also require determining the relative contributions to ozone
depletion of current and past activities of other states, taking into ac158.
Id. § 313.
159.
See, e.g., Edwin M. Smith, Understanding Dynamic Obligations: Arms Control
Agreements, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 1549 (1991).
160.
In the GATT and the WTO, compensation for breaches is obtained via suspension
of tariff concessions-reciprocal noncompliance, or a form of trade sanction. Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2: Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 22, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1143. See also JOHN H.
JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS

340-44 (4th ed.

2002); Chamovitz, supra note 21, at 802, 822; Joost Pauwelyn, Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO: Rules are Rules-Toward a More Collective Approach, 94 AM. J. INT'L
L. 335, 341-45 (2002) (arguing that compensation under the WTO dispute settlement process
is inadequate).
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count the stratosphere's natural ability to regenerate itself over long periods of time. Superimposed on these difficulties would be disputes over
what types of ecological harms and human diseases could be attributed
to increased solar ultraviolet radiation as opposed to other influences
unrelated to ozone depletion.
Traditional economic methodologies of measuring environmental
harm have been controversial.' 6' Market-based valuation methodologies
have been criticized for failing to account properly for the vital functions
and benefits that ecosystems provide. 62 For many environmental goods
such as clean air, no applicable markets exist, but there can be no queslife
tion that such goods are no less valuable
63 and important to human
than goods available in the marketplace.'
Even more difficult to assess for compensation purposes is the value
of noneconomic and noninstrumental aspects of the environment. Aesthetic and existence values are the best-known and most widely accepted
values, but the environment also encompasses noneconomic values assigned by advocates of animal rights, environmental ethics, or cultural
values in the environment.'6 Methodologies such as contingent valuation 165 are helpful in this regard. But little consensus exists in the United
States on the types of uses, values, and harms that should be included in
such quantification efforts or the criteria for measuring them. '66 Such
valuation difficulties would be similarly, if not more, intractable internationally.
Quantitative valuation seems just as difficult or impossible for the
diffuse and long-term benefits of strong and respected treaty norms, including the rule of law: higher levels of compliance, lower enforcement
costs, and more order in the international system. The same is the case
with the consequences of unchecked breaches: demoralization of compliant parties and the adverse precedential effect of inviting future
breaches.' 67 Of course, compensation is not the only remedy for breach,

161.

See generally FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING

THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004).

162.

See, e.g., James Salzman et al., ProtectingEcosystem Services: Science, Economics,

and Law, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 309 (2001).

163.
See generally Laurence H. Tribe, Ways Not To Think About Plastic Trees: New
FoundationsFor Environmental Law, 83 YALE L.J. 1315, 1315-48 (1974).
164.
See, e.g., WILLIAM F. BAXTER, PEOPLE OR PENGUINS: THE CASE FOR OPTIMAL
POLLUTION; cf Tribe, supra note 163. See also Natural Resource Damage Assessment, 51
Fed. Reg. 27674 (Aug. 1, 1986) (codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 11).
165.
See generally Frank B. Cross, Natural Resource Damage Valuation, 42 VAND. L.
REV. 269,315-20 (1989).
166.
See, e.g., Ohio v. Dep't of Interior, 880 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
Cf Yoshida, supra note 63, at 137 (noting concern by developing countries about
167.
consequences of illegal Russian ODS exports on their markets). See generally Frank
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but any perspective driven primarily by considerations of national interest and security would rely in the first instance on a utilitarian analysis of
enforcement-the methodology underlying the treaty-as-contract perspective. Given the difficulties of valuation, enforcement will occur at
less than optimal levels.
3. The Authoritative Nature of Treaty Norms
The predominance of instrumental attitudes also neglects the authoritative and autonomous nature of treaty norms. First, as components
of a system of public law, treaties give rise to norms that are legal and
thus authoritative. They command obedience regardless of inconvenience or immediate self-interest, unless excused by other legal doctrines
such as necessity, consent, and the operation of conflicting peremptory
norms.' As a source of compliance, legal norms operate independently
from instrumental considerations.'69 Second, as legal institutions, treaties
possess identities and exist separately from the states parties to them.'7 °
Treaty norms are thus autonomous of the interests of the parties, 7 ' and
norm compliance is an institutional interest that transcends the parties
directly affected by a breach.'72
Instrumentalist approaches undermine this authoritative and
autonomous character of treaty norms. For states that subscribe primarily
Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just
Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1214-18 (1967).
168.
See, e.g., Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 113, arts. 20-26; Case
Concerning the Gabikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovak.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 40-41 (Sept.
25); VCLT, supra note 17, art. 53.
169.
That is not to say that social welfare considerations are not relevant. See, e.g.,
United States v. Caroll Towing, 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947) (cost-benefit balancing in negligence analysis); see generally RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (3d ed. 1986).
However, law as a basis for compliance and enforcement is not coextensive with and necessarily dependent upon its social welfare costs and benefits. Legal norms compel obedience
because conforming one's behavior to the norm is the appropriate course of action.
170.
See, e.g., Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations,
Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 187-88 (Apr. 11) (allowing United Nations to recover
damages on behalf of its employees against a nonmember state); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 233 (1987). See also JANIS, supra
note 125, at 197-99; Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Why States Act Through Formal
Organizations,42 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 3, 24-26 (1998).
171.
See, e.g., TERRY NARDIN, LAW, MORALITY, AND THE RELATIONS OF STATES 3-19
(1983); Kal Raustiala & Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law, International Relations
and Compliance, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 538-58, 543 (Carlsnaes et al.
eds., 2002).
172.
See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 100 (John
Ladd trans., Bobbs-Merrill 1965) (1780) (suggesting an independent categorical imperative to
punish breaches of law); NAOMI ROHT-ARRIAZA, IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 24-56 (1995) (discussing the independent duty to punish or
enforce the law present in many religions and philosophical writings and the emergence of a
legal duty to enforce the law against individual violators).
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to a foreign policy based on rational self-interest and power politics,
norms play no significant role in decision-making processes. Unless social welfare analysis can provide a persuasive reason for action in
response to a breach of treaty norms, such states are unlikely to take enforcement measures. 7 1 Instrumentalist perspectives also can subvert
appropriate enforcement mechanisms when responses to breaches are
deliberately manipulated. For example, a violator may bribe key parties,
perhaps the most powerful states parties, in order to guarantee inaction
in response to breaches. The result is not only failure to mobilize institutional support for sanctions, but also subversion of the normative and
legal character of international law more generally.
The rule of law arguably has grown stronger in international relations in recent decades. One indication of this trend may be more
instances in which enforcement actions appear "altruistic," and thus independent of national self-interest.17 But such interventions remain rare,
and they are unheard of for breaches of environmental agreements.
IV.

GENERATING THE "ENFORCEMENT GOOD"

Given the structural complexities of triggering enforcement actions,
how can enforcement responses to noncompliance be increased? At least
three general approaches suggest themselves: A) changing the enforcement calculus, B) promoting entrepreneurial enforcement, and
C) altering treaty design.
A. Changing the Enforcement Calculus
If collective inaction and strategic behavior are the result of individual
self-interest misaligned with the communal good of enforcement, one solution is to alter costs and benefits to promote enforcement actions. This
may be accomplished either by creating incentives for behavioral changes
or changing the value of enforcement and compliance. The result is to
modify the structure of the collective action problem and the likelihood
of enforcement.

Likewise, if compliance occurs solely as a matter of immediate self-interest, it ob173.
viously will cease when self-interest and convenience no longer provide the motivation to
comply.
For example, consider the interventions in humanitarian crises during the 1990s in
174.
Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, East Timor, and others. See, e.g., Fernando R. Teson, Collective HumanitarianIntervention, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 323 (1996).
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1. Adjusting the Incentives to Engage in Enforcement
Enforcement activities can be stimulated by increasing the positive
benefits that flow from a successful outcome, by reducing the cost of
initiation or participation, or by raising the cost of inaction. The most
direct method of increasing benefits is through financial incentives. For
example, a common fund created through financial contributions from
treaty parties can subsidize enforcement. Although such a fund would
raise separate collective action problems, ample precedent supports the
feasibility of this option.' Alternatively, a successful party might be allowed to recover the costs of enforcement action (such as legal fees)
from the losing party. Benefits from a successful enforcement action
could also be increased by creating a bounty, for example, as provided
76
under U.S. law in qui tam actions.
The effect of such financial incentives should not be overestimated,
however. For industrialized countries, and even many large developing
nations, the administrative costs of pursuing an enforcement action are
likely to be insignificant. Other considerations and costs, including the
potential for retaliatory action, damage to long-term relationships and
mutually beneficial arrangements, and-if military intervention is pon77
dered-the cost of human lives, are likely to be much more significant.
Promoting enforcement through positive financial incentives also entails
institutional costs. Not every violation merits sanctions. Even if an enforcement action is well grounded in fact and executed in good faith, it
might not merit the expenditure of institutional resources necessary for
vindication. 78 If positive incentives for enforcement are sufficiently high,

175.
See Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol,
http://www.multilateralfund.org/homepage.htm; Global Environment Facility, Instrumentfor
the Establishment of the Restructured Global Environment Facility (May 2004),
http://thegef.org/GEFInstrument3.pdf. See also Montreal Protocol, supra note 69, art. 10
(establishing the Multilateral Fund).
176.
As discussed above, compensation remedies will usually be inadequate incentives
for enforcement actions because of valuation and proof of causation difficulties. Damage
claims for environmental noncompliance may also accrue to individuals or businesses rather
than states. As a result, analogous problems of misaligned incentives arise for states to initiate
enforcement actions. Unless the claims involve significant national interests or are of a particularly high profile, "the state to which [the national] belongs may be unwilling to take up
his case for reasons which have nothing to do with its merits." BRIERLY, supra note 37, at 218.
But see, e.g., Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 REP. INT'L ARB. AWARDS 1905 (1941); see
also John Read, The Trail Smelter Dispute, 1 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 213, 213-17 (1963).
177.
Imposition of import tariffs as trade sanctions can create more significant financial
rewards to the enforcer. See, e.g., Warren F. Schwartz & Alan 0. Sykes, The Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute Resolution in the World Trade Organization, 31 J. LEGAL
STUD. 179, 199 (2002). But they also exact economic costs from the enforcer's economy.
178.
It is also not clear how easily such incentives and disincentives could be calibrated
to provide an appropriate set of incentives for enforcers. Neal Katyal has also pointed out in
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they might encourage the abuse or over-application of sanctions to inconsequential breaches.' 7 9
The alternative to positive inducement is to increase the cost of inaction.'8 ° Negative incentives may be most useful in changing the behavior
of states that would otherwise stand on the sidelines and ignore a treaty
violation. This negative approach differs little from the use of punitive
sanctions to encourage compliance in the first instance-the use of sticks
rather than carrots. One might even view such efforts as the "enforcement" of sanctions obligations. Participation in multilateral sanctioning
duty.
activity, such as a trade embargo, would become a sanctionable
8
sanctions.1 1
Failure to participate would itself trigger punitive
Lisa Martin has studied one version of this approach in her work on
82
coerced cooperation in sanctioning activity.' She concluded that, in recent decades, multilateral cooperation in maintaining trade sanctions
occurred in a number of instances because the cost of noncooperation
was a significant motivating factor. Failure to participate would have
brought serious adverse consequences for the defecting party. For example, the European Community imposed trade sanctions in the 1980s
against Argentina because of the Falklands War with the United Kingdom. Although "the Irish government developed a strong distaste for
supporting the British through economic measures ... , it maintained
sanctions through their original term because the EC would not agree to
lifting them. Afraid of jeopardizing other EC benefits, such as farm sub' 3
sidies, Ireland reluctantly abided by its obligations." 11 This example also
demonstrates that threatened withdrawal of benefits may induce sanctions participation if the defecting party sufficiently relies on the
benefits.' "
2. Changing the Value of Enforcement and the Rule of Law
The decision calculus can also be altered more indirectly by changing the value of enforcement. It may be possible to modify national
the criminal law context that increased deterrent efforts can lead to undesirable substitution
effects. Neal Kuma Katyal, Deterrence'sDifficulty, 95 MICH. L. REV.2385, 2386-89 (1997).
A less direct means of increasing enforcement benefits is to improve the effective179.
ness of sanctions. If enforcement failures are attributable to expectations that sanctions are
ineffective or are unlikely to achieve compliance, appropriate sanctions choice and design can
increase the efficacy of sanctions regimes.
While the idea of increasing the detriment for failure to initiate enforcement actions
180.
might seem ludicrous, the notion of coercing or committing in advance to respond to security
threats is not. It was the basis of mutually assured destruction strategies during the nuclear
arms race of the Cold War.
See Mahoney & Sanchirico, supra note 146.
181.
MARTIN, supra note 129.
182.
Id. at 245.
183.
See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 102, at 184-85.
184.
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attitudes about the desirability of enforcement by promoting the incorpo85
ration of treaty norms and the rule of law into national law and culture1
However, attempts to change norms, values, and identity encounter the
same difficulties as transformational approaches to compliance. Such
changes require internalizing treaty norms and altering governmental
perceptions of the national interest. The potential for success is arguably
no greater than the ability of transnational legal processes to promote
compliance in the first instance.
The practical reality, however, may be less daunting. Normal treaty
implementation processes purposefully incorporate treaty norms into
national law. Furthermore, treaty norms often are already deeply held
and intensely valued in many states. 8.6 For example, many of the human
rights norms embodied in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights reflect principles embedded in the legal systems of the United
States, Western Europe, and other democratic nations. With respect to
the environment, treaties are more the expression of existing agreement
about the importance of environmental protection and sustainable development than the creation of new values and norms.
Instead, the difficulty of effecting change arises in encouraging systematic engagement with treaty norms so that they may serve as a
consistent source of enforcement responses rather than as a pretext for
other foreign policy objectives. In other words, the problem is a rule of
law issue. Liberal theorists have argued that adherence to the rule of law
in the international system depends in part on whether a state adheres to
the rule of law within its internal governance system.' 7 Promotion of
democratic structures and political systems based on the rule of law thus
seem to be one avenue toward solidifying the rule of law internationally.
Anne-Marie Slaughter and Laurence Helfer also have suggested that
linking international institutions to national institutions committed to the
rule of law, such as domestic court systems, can contribute to that goal
substantially.'8 8 In effect, engaging those parts of a nation's government
that are committed to the preservation and implementation of legal
norms can strengthen the country's commitment to international law.

185.
In the context of the prisoner's dilemma, see supra note 102, one might view this
approach as changing the pay-off matrix through means internal to the prisoners-perhaps, for
instance, the prisoners have been led to see the wrongfulness of their ways with regard to
"snitching" and betraying each other. They have been taught "honor among thieves."
186.
See, e.g., CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 2, at 8 (discussing "obedience to law").
But see Oona Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Really Make a Difference?, Ill YALE L.J.
1935 (2002).
187.
See, e.g., Teson, supra note 174.
188.
Heifer & Slaughter, supra note 23, at 331.
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3. Is More Enforcement Always Better?:
Limits on the Use of Coercive Sanctions
Approaches that promote more frequent and consistent enforcement
responses to noncompliance must be tempered with consideration of
whether more enforcement is always better. At least three issues inform
this consideration: 1) the legality of the imposed sanctions, 2) legitimate
but nonlegal reasons to decline enforcement, such as concerns about resources, fairness, and justice, and 3) the problem of treaty withdrawal.
First, responses to noncompliance may be limited by the very in9
strument that authorizes them in the first instance. Environmental
treaty agreements generally do not include such mechanisms, but other
limitations may apply. Threats or actual use of force remain subject to
9
the prohibitions of the UN Charter.' Sanctions must also be directed at
9
the responsible state and not at third parties.' ' They must be temporary
9 2 proportionate to the violation,' 9' preceded by notice of the
in nature,
94
intent to impose sanctions and an offer to negotiate, and compliant
with basic obligations, including peremptory norms of international
law. 95
In the absence of a formal institutional enforcement mechanism, the
legality of sanctions activities by states that are not directly and materially harmed by the breach is unclear. Articles 48 and 54 of the
International Law Commission's Draft Articles on State Responsibility
acknowledge the interest of such states in the breach, but the Commission did not take a position on the permissibility of individual
enforcement actions purely to vindicate a collective interest in treaty
See, e.g., Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
189.
Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 2, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 at § 1, 3 (7), 22.
See also Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 113, ch. 2 cmt. 9.
U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.; G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV) at 122-23, U.N. Doc. A/8082
190.

(Oct. 24, 1970);

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

§ 905(2) (1987). See also Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 113, art.
50(l)(a).
Case Concerning the Gabikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovak.), 1997 I.C.J.
191.
7, 55-56 (Sept. 25), 83; Naulilaa (Port. v. Ger.), 2 R.I.A.A. 1013, 1027 (1928). See also
Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 113, arts. 49(1)-(2).
See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 113, arts. 49(2)-(3), 53.
192.
Gabikovo-Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. at 56-57; Naulilaa, 2 R.I.A.A. at 1028;
193.
Air Services Agreement of March 27, 1946 (U.S. v. Fr.), 18 R.I.A.A. 417,443-44 (1978). See
also Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 113, art. 51.
Gabikovo-Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. at 56; Air Services Agreement of March
194.
27, 1946, 18 R.I.A.A. at 444. See also Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 113,
art. 52.
See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U. S.),
195.
1986 I.C.J. 14, 100-01 (June 27). See also Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note
113, art. 50(l)(d).
STATES
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compliance. 96 Nevertheless, states have participated in collective enforcement actions for gross violations of international human rights,
even without claiming a special injury.
Beyond illegality, imposing sanctions for each and every instance of
noncompliance may be inappropriate for other legitimate reasons. Just as
enforcement decisions within national legal systems require the considered exercise of prosecutorial discretion,' 97 limited resources mandate
that environmental treaty enforcement focus on the most pressing violations. Some breaches may be minimal or inadvertent and imposing
sanctions may be of little institutional benefit. Other breaches, even if
minor, may be persistent and willful, and may warrant sanctions because
of their substantial symbolic significance and deterrent effect.
Considerations of fairness and justice-or situations of uncertainty
or lack of proof of the breach-may also counsel against enforcement
proceedings, especially given that defending against an enforcement action can be a burden in itself. Another consideration could be the
potential for unintended collateral effects on "innocent" populations,"
or what one might call "punishment externalities." In fact, the strongest
sanctioning mechanisms, such as trade embargos and military interventions, usually affect the civilian population much more severely than any
of the governmental actors they target. Because the hardships imposed
on the target nation's people can amount to collective punishment,' 99 a
decision to proceed with sanctions in such instances can undermine important values.
The extra-legal, discretionary considerations noted here are not exhaustive, and, although they do not appear formally in treaties or
agreements, they are nevertheless legitimate decision-making criteria.
Such discretion, however, presents a converse risk: it may be abused,
196.
See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 113, 1 1-6. See also Robert
Rosenstock & Margo Kaplan, The Fifty-Third Session of the InternationalLaw Commission,
96 AM. J. INT'L L. 412, 413 (2002); Michael Akehurst, Reprisals by Third States, 44 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L. L. 1 (1970); Jonathan I. Charney, Third State Remedies in InternationalLaw, 10
MICH. J. INT'L L. 57 (1988).
197.
See generally U.S. Dept. of Justice, Principles of Federal Prosecution, U.S. Attorneys' Manual 9-27.100 to 9-27.320 (setting out criteria and considerations for initiating and
declining federal criminal prosecutions). Prosecutors may consider in particular law enforcement priorities; the nature and seriousness of the offense; the deterrent effect of prosecution; a
person's culpability, criminal history, willingness to cooperate, or personal circumstances; and
the probable sentence or consequences. Id. at 9-27.230. Impermissible considerations include
the defendant's race, sex, religion, and political beliefs; personal animus; or professional or
personal advantage. Id. at 9-27.260. For a general evaluation of prosecutorial discretion, see
James Vorenberg, Decent Restraintof ProsecutorialPower, 94 HARv. L. REV. 1521 (1981).
198.
See, e.g., ELIAS DAVIDSSON, THE DEBATE ON ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: A STORY OF
BLIND SPOTS AND OBFUSCATIONS (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
199.
FISHER, supra note 123, at 48-51, 69; see also WILD, supra note 1, at 213-16, 218-
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held hostage by norm violators, or otherwise invoked as an illegitimate
pretext for nonenforcement. As with abuse of sanctions regimes themselves, institutionalization can reduce abuse of enforcement discretion.
Efforts to institutionalize parts of the enforcement process are evident in the Montreal Protocol and CITES. Both instruments have shifted
determinations of noncompliance as well as determinations of the appropriateness and severity of sanctions responses to collective decisionmaking bodies. 2°° Under the Montreal Protocol, the Implementation
Committee assesses compliance, 0 while under CITES the Standing
Committee fulfills this function. °2 Alternatively, the decision to impose
sanctions could be entrusted to individuals who serve in independent,
quasi-judicial capacities, subject to the review of the treaty parties.
Finally, deterrent responses to noncompliance do not operate in a
self-contained system. The ultimate option of treaty withdrawal is usually available. In other words, imposing deterrent sanctions might evoke
not avoidance of sanctions through norm compliance or the acceptance
20 3
of such sanctions, but rather exit from the treaty system. Thus, overly
strict and severe application of sanctions could reduce overall treaty ef2°4
fectiveness by leading the offending party to abrogate the treaty. For
example, this concern likely led the Montreal Protocol parties to forego
harsher responses to Russia's persistent noncompliance." Given Russia's significant capacity to produce and potentially use ozone-depleting
substances, its potential withdrawal from the treaty may have been seen
as more counterproductive to the specific goal of protecting the stratospheric ozone layer than tolerating its noncompliance.
The threat of withdrawal is a particularly difficult challenge. While
the threat may be real, so is the potential for abuse as a means of defending against enforcement actions. As a matter of legal principle, such
considerations arguably are not appropriate grounds for nonenforcement.
Yet, practical politics and the reality of the international system may
demand it. General avoidance of such conflicts, whether by proactive
management of compliance or by appropriate tailoring of the sanctions,
See, e.g., REEVE, supra note 31, at 91-133.
See supra Part I.B.2.
201.
Since 1989, the Standing Committee has been responsible for "deciding on meas202.
ures against non-compliant countries, including trade sanctions, on the basis of Secretariat
recommendations." REEVE, supra note 31, at 266-67. Institutionalization has not been complete, however. The individual members are representatives of their states and do not act in an
independent capacity. Questions of impartiality and objectivity are thus not surprising. Reeve
has suggested that party members of the Standing Committee have on occasion acted and
voted blatantly on the basis of their own national self-interest rather than as representatives of
other states or even of the international community. Id. at 267.
See VCLT, supra note 17, arts. 54, 56.
203.
See, e.g., Helfer, supra note 111.
204.
See supra Part I.B.2.
205.

200.
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would serve the treaty system well. Otherwise, the adverse precedent of
nonenforcement could significantly undermine the long-term viability of
the treaty and the credibility of the treaty norms as a whole.
B. Promoting EntrepreneurialEnforcement
Another option for generating the enforcement good is "entrepreneurial enforcement" through the efforts of nongovernmental entities and
private citizens to trigger or participate in enforcement action. The approach gives entities other than states the ability to take supplementary
enforcement actions, analogous to environmental citizen suits" or qui
tam actions.
Taking private or entrepreneurial enforcement seriously is important
for at least three reasons. First, entrepreneurial enforcement would shift
some of the cost of enforcement from a limited number of states to a
much greater number of interested individuals and nongovernmental organizations. Those willing and able to bear the cost of enforcement
could participate in the process. As in the U.S. environmental regulatory
system, enforcement entrepreneurs could step into an enforcement vacuum. 20 7 Second, decentralizing enforcement recognizes the increased
importance of transnational actors and the divergence of their interests
from states. Entities such as environmental NGOs or human rights
groups often have a greater interest in enforcing treaty norms than do
states. Third, the converse benefit of decentralization is its ability to prevent the capture of the enforcement machinery by particular interest
groups-to resist being held hostage by political considerations.
By allowing those interested in enforcement to seek the vindication
of treaty norms themselves, the monolithic and unitary standing of states
under international law is disaggregated 8 Constituent parts interested in
furthering international values and norms can transcend other parts more
oriented toward national self-interest or focused only on private, selfserving ends.20 9 The citizen submission process of the North American
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) reflects an entrepreneurial approach to noncompliance 2.
Private enforcement of
206.
See Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2000); Clean Air Act (CAA), 42
U.S.C. § 7604 (2000); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 6972
(2000).
207.
For a discussion of the challenges of private enforcement of treaty obligations in
U.S. law, see Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92
COLUM. L. REV. 1082 (1992).
208.
Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 23, at 335.
209.
But see FISHER, supra note 123, at 173-83.
210.
Even though it is not a true enforcement mechanism, the number of submissions
since its creation indicates that entrepreneurial involvement of private individuals and nongovernmental organizations can significantly increase the frequency of responses to
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international treaty norms has also contributed significantly to the authority and effectiveness of the rulings of the European Court of Justice
(ECJ) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).1
C. Treaty Design and the Structure of Regulation

A third approach to generating the enforcement good is to consider
treaty design and the structure of regulation more broadly. Like efforts to
212
improved treaty design can encourage enencourage compliance,
forcement by altering the structure (or "architecture") of regulation.1 3
One such approach focuses on the nature of environmental degradation
and the structure of indirect regulation by most multilateral environ214
mental agreements.
The vast majority of environmental treaties impose obligations priSince private individuals or
marily on national governments.1
however, treaty comdegradation,
environmental
most
cause
businesses
mitments usually entail either explicit or implicit mandates for party
states to regulate such activities. In effect, environmental treaties endeavor to "regulate" the regulatory activities of states. Frequently,
noncompliance by party states arises because of a failure to implement
the mandate to regulate. As a result, the entities responsible for treaty
compliance and targets of enforcement actions (states) are not the same
entities that ultimately must change their behavior to achieve the treaty
objective (individuals and businesses). Sanctions therefore have little
direct effect on the individuals or businesses even though these entities
are actually responsible for the failure to achieve substantive treaty objectives.

noncompliance events. See generally John Knox, A New Approach to Compliance with International Environmental Law: The Submissions Procedure of the NAFTA Environmental
Commission, 28 EcOLOGY L.Q. 1 (2001); see also Yang, supra note 3.
Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 23, at 288, 293, 296-97.
211.
212.
See supra Parts I.B.2-3.
213.
An example of utilizing treaty design to promote accomplishment of environmental
treaty goals is the incorporation of market-based mechanisms in the Kyoto Protocol. See generally Claire Breidenich et al., supra note 98, at 323-25 (arts. 4, 6, 12, & 17). The marketbased mechanisms are designed to make accomplishment of carbon emissions reduction goals
cheaper and hence more palatable to the parties.
214.
See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661
(1998) (discussing a change in "architecture"). To use the prisoner's dilemma metaphor, the
prosecutor might seek an entirely different way of obtaining conviction. Rather than encouraging confession, incriminating evidence could also be obtained by looking for other evidence or
eyewitnesses.
215.
See OPPENHEIM, supra note 38, at 636-39. See also Carlos Vazquez, Treaty-Based
Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1082, 1088-1093 (1992).
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The historical experience of federal environmental regulation illustrates the resulting challenge for achieving environmental goals.2 6 Prior
to the vast expansion of the federal government's power to regulate the
environment in the 1960s and 1970s, environmental regulation was primarily the responsibility of individual states. When the failure of state
and local governments to manage rising levels of pollution and environmental degradation became a national concern, the federal government
initially intervened with financial aid and research assistance. 2 " These
programs failed to achieve the desired pollution abatements. Congress
then began to require states to adopt various environmental standards." 8
These efforts failed as well. Significant improvements came only when
the federal government asserted primary regulatory authority in the
1970s. Those legislative changes vested a newly created Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) with permit issuance, standard-setting, and
criminal, civil, and administrative enforcement authority.2 9 This expansion of federal authority drastically changed the regulatory dynamic.
Rather than promoting state regulation and simply "regulating the regulators," the federal government asserted direct oversight over
environmental matters, circumventing the states.
Contemporary multilateral environmental agreements have largely
followed the model of pre-1970s U.S. regulatory efforts: committing
member governments to focus domestic regulatory attention on environmental issues, providing for information exchange and
communication between the treaty parties, and assisting in various capacity-building efforts. The historical experience of the United States
suggests treaty norms should also focus on individual conduct, 220 in addition to enlisting the help of national governments.
The result would forge a tighter connection between treaty objectives and the mechanisms designed to achieve them. First, it would
separate the interests of the enforcer (the state) from those of the target
(the polluter). Party states would not face the unappealing prospect of a
216.

For a related discussion of the problem of imposing sanctions on the U.S. states, see

FISHER, supra note 123, at 42-46.
217.
See Robert Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contemporary Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141, 1155-56 (1995); William Furtrell, The History of
Environmental Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: FROM RESOURCES TO RECOVERY 30-31 (Celia

Campbell Mohn et al. eds., 1993).
218.
Furtrell, supra note 217, at 31. Such steps included requiring states to adopt water
quality standards in 1965 and increasing federal involvement in air pollution issues by creating

an ambitious framework to improve air quality in 1967. Id.
219.
See generally id.
220.
See, e.g., Jordan Paust, The Other Side of Right: Private Duties under Human
Rights Law, 5 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 51 (1992); Steven Ratner, Corporations and Human
Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, Ill YALE L.J. 443, 475-89 (2001); WILD, supra
note 1, at 180-95,222; FISHER, supra note 123, at 73.
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coercive sanctions mechanism that could be used against them in the
future. It would also avoid the potential damage and alienation that punitive sanctions can cause to the cooperative relationship between the
treaty institution and the member states. Strong enforcement mechanisms could thus become more palatable to the most powerful states,
whose power and sovereignty would otherwise be challenged directly.
Second, focusing on individual conduct strengthens the effectiveness of
sanctions, which can directly affect the incentive to pollute."' When
sanctions are imposed on governments, responsible officials often lack a
significant personal stake in compliance and must consider competing
government priorities and national interests; resistance is much likelier
in this context. Finally, making norms and the associated sanctions applicable to particular individual conduct strengthens the message of
moral condemnation.
Another approach to facilitating sanctions processes is to privatize
both compliance and enforcement. Ronald Mitchell's study of oil pollution prevention efforts under the International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL)22 is illustrative. Mitchell
found that directly imposing equipment standards for oil tanker design
through MARPOL decisions was a far superior strategy in achieving oil
pollution prevention goals than directly limiting the discharge of pollutants that had to be enforced by party states. 223 The equipment standards
were largely irreversible once implemented. By contrast, discharge limits
required intense monitoring efforts in order to be effective. The standards also took advantage of existing government enforcement
mechanisms and shifted the focus from state parties to the entities engaged in the conduct that could result in oil pollution. 224 Finally, the
equipment standards also recruited classification societies and vessel
insurers as norm enforcers. These entities have taken on significant roles
in ensuring that new vessel construction conforms to MARPOL standards.22 5 The overall result was to shift enforcement responsibility to
private entities and allow international legal norms to apply directly
221.

23

See David Wippman, Atrocities, Deterrence, and the Limits of InternationalJustice,

FORDHAM INT'L L.J.

473, 473-87 (1999).

222.
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Nov. 2, 1973,
12 I.L.M. 1319 (entered into force Oct. 2, 1983).
223.
Regulatory approaches that required government enforcement, such as monitoring,
investigation, and prosecution of discharge prohibitions, were enforced at very low frequency.
In contrast, approaches that could be enforced by private parties led to virtually 100% compliance. See RONALD B. MITCHELL, INTERNATIONAL OIL POLLUTION AT SEA: ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY AND TREATY COMPLIANCE 123-88, 221-92 (1994).
224.
Id. at 263-65.
225.
The primary sanction available to classification societies is nonissuance of classifications. The effect of the sanction is to make the ship ineligible to obtain insurance coverage,
making it effectively impossible to operate.
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within, or to penetrate into, domestic legal systems, thereby engaging
their transformative function more effectively.226

As a public good, institutional deterrent sanctions encounter obstacles of strategic behavior, the second order nature of the collective action
problem, and the weak normative foundations of treaty compliance and
enforcement in generating them. However, there are at least three distinct
solutions for encouraging higher levels and more systematic enforcement of treaty norms: 1) modification of the enforcement calculus,
2) promotion of entrepreneurial involvement to shift the costs and burden of enforcement, and 3) alteration of treaty structures and designs.
Beyond pointing to approaches to solving the enforcement problem,
this analysis can also be utilized to understand the prospect of success of
new enforcement mechanisms. I now turn to an examination of the noncompliance mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol and its implications for
future environmental treaties.
V. AN EXAMINATION OF THE 1997 KYOTO PROTOCOL'S
NONCOMPLIANCE MECHANISM

The newest member of the family of treaty enforcement instruments
is the noncompliance mechanism of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. The
mechanism introduces new ideas and holds much promise, but it also
faces significant challenges. This section will examine the mechanism in
light of the foregoing discussion.
The Kyoto Protocol to the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change establishes binding greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions limits for
industrialized countries.227 Beginning in 2008, these parties will, on average, have to cap their GHG emissions at five percent below 1990 levels.
Country-specific emissions caps are set out in Annex B to the Protocol.
The Kyoto Protocol also includes market-based mechanisms designed to
28
create flexibility and ease compliance with the emissions caps. Compliance with the caps is to be policed primarily through a noncompliance

See Ann Marie Burley & Walter Mattli, Europe before the Court: A PoliticalTheory
226.
of Legal Integration, 47 INT'L ORG. 41, 74 (1993).
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
227.
Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (entered into force Feb.16, 2005), available at http://
unfccc.int/essentialbackground/kyoto-protocol/items/1678.php [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
See id. arts. 4, 6, 12, & 17. See generally Breidenich et al., supra note 98, at 323228.

25.
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mechanism, as authorized by Article 18.229 With ratification by Russia,
the Protocol entered into force on February 16, 2005. The mechanism
was adopted at the first meeting of the parties in December 2005.
A. An Overview of the Noncompliance Mechanism
A twenty-member Compliance Committee administers the noncompliance mechanism. The committee is subdivided into an enforcement
branch, a facilitative branch, a bureau, and a plenary committee. One
half of the membership serves in the enforcement branch and the other
half in the facilitative branch. Members of each branch are selected with
an eye to reflecting geographical diversity, including small island nations, and based on their Annex 1 membership status.23 ' The chairs and
vice-chairs of each branch comprise the bureau, which has as its primary
responsibility the task of allocating "questions of implementation"potential noncompliance issues-between the two branches.232 The plenary committee is made up of all twenty members and handles all
3
administrative and reporting matters .233
The facilitative branch is similar to the Implementation Committee
of the Montreal Protocol and is "responsible for providing advice and
facilitation to Parties in implementing the Protocol, and for promoting
compliance by Parties with their commitments under the Protocol.' 23 By
contrast, the enforcement branch addresses specific instances of noncompliance with the Annex B emissions caps; the methodological and
reporting requirements; and the eligibility requirements of the Clean Development mechanism (Article 6), Joint Implementation (Article 12),
and emissions trading (Article 17).235 It is also responsible for applying
the "consequences" of noncompliance. The decisions of the branch are
to be adopted by consensus. If consensus cannot be reached, a threefourths majority-including simple majorities each of Annex I and of
non-Annex I countries-must support the decision.236
229.
Procedures and Mechanisms Relating to Compliance under the Kyoto Protocol,
Decision 24/CP.7, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.3 (Nov. 10, 2001) [hereinafter Decision
24/CP.7]. Two additional means of addressing noncompliance are the multilateral consultative
process of the Framework Convention and the dispute settlement provisions. Kyoto Protocol,
supra note 227, arts. 16, 18. These two processes are to operate unaffected by the noncompliance process. Decision 24/CP.7 § XVI.
230.
Decision 24/CP.7, supra note 229, § II.
231.
Id. §§ II(6), IV(I), V(I).
232.
Id. § VH(l).
233.
Id. § IH.
234.
Id. § IV(4).
235.
Id. § V(4).
236.
Id. § 11(9). Annex I to the UN Framework Convention includes the industrialized
countries included in the Kyoto Protocol's Annex B, plus Turkey.
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Questions of implementation may be brought to the attention of the
Compliance Committee by reports of the expert review teams, a state
party with respect to itself, and other parties when supported by corroborating evidence. 23 7 The matter is dealt with in two stages. In the first
stage, the responsible branch engages in a preliminary examination of
the matter to ensure it is "supported by sufficient information," is "not de
minimis or ill-founded," and is "based on the requirements of the Protocol., 238 If the noncompliance complaint passes the preliminary
examination, a substantively more detailed inquiry ensues in the second
stage. Deliberations by both branches during this stage may be based on
a broad range of relevant information, including expert advice. 239 Decisions must be supported by conclusions and reasons and, together with
the 24information
considered, will usually be made available to the pub0
lic.

The noncompliance mechanism also contains specific provisions for
the management of a second stage enforcement branch proceeding. 4
First, the party whose noncompliance is at issue may submit its own materials on the issue and may request a hearing.2 2 After review of the
information before it, the enforcement branch must then either adopt a
preliminary finding that the party concerned is not in compliance or, alternatively, issue a decision not to proceed. 243 In the event of a
preliminary finding of noncompliance, the party concerned may provide
additional written comments. 2" Thereafter, the branch is to issue a final
decision either confirming or modifying the preliminary finding.245 A
party may appeal enforcement branch decisions relating to compliance
with a party's emissions caps to the full set of Kyoto Protocol parties if
the party "believes it has been denied due process 246 If no appeal is
taken, the decision becomes "definitive" after forty-five days.
Overall, the consequences of the noncompliance mechanism are
"aimed at the restoration of compliance to ensure environmental integrity, and [intended to] provide for an incentive to comply. 24 7 Remedies
applied by the facilitative branch will provide assistance and aid to help
237.
Id. § VI(l); Kyoto Protocol, supra note 227, art. 8(3).
238.
Decision 24/CP.7, supra note 229, § VII(2).
239.
Id. §§ VII(3)-(5).
240.
Id. §§ VIII(7)-(8), IX(6), IX(9)-(10).
241.
With respect to violations that might make parties ineligible for participation with
the Articles 6, 12, and 17 Kyoto mechanisms, the enforcement branch applies a special expedited procedure. Id. § X.
242.
Id. §§ IX(l)-(2).
243.
Id. § IX(4).
244.
Id. § IX(7).
245.
Id. §§ IX(7)-(8).
246.
Id. § XI(1).
247.
Id. § V(6).
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a party remedy its breach. 8 In contrast, the measures applied by the enforcement branch are designed to be more coercive and are
automatically applicable upon a final determination of noncompliance. 249
They include the issuance of a noncompliance declaration and development of a compliance plan.20 In addition, when a party has failed to limit
its emissions as required by Annex B, the result is
(a) Deduction from the Party's assigned amount for the second
commitment period of a number of tonnes equal to 1.3 times the
amount in tonnes of excess emissions; ... [and]

(c) Suspension of the eligibility to make transfers under Article
17 [emissions trading] ... until the Party is reinstated in accor-

25
dance with section X. '

The noncompliance mechanism explicitly provides that for subsequent commitment periods, the rate of deduction for excess emissions is
to be determined by amendment. 2
B. A Critique
Even before its official approval and application, the noncompliance
'
mechanism was hailed as "the most robust '253
and "the most innovative
and elaborate noncompliance procedure for any existing multilateral
environmental agreement."2" Many of its features are unquestionably
novel and innovative for an environmental treaty. They make unique
contributions toward the goals of the Kyoto Protocol, but questions about
the mechanism's overall effectiveness remain.
1. Strategic Behavior
One of the most important accomplishments of the Kyoto mechanism is to institutionalize the process of enforcement in a neutral and
independent body. The creation of an enforcement branch reduces the
248.
249.

Id. § XIV.
Id. § XV.

250.
Id. §§ XV(1)-(3). When eligibility for the mechanisms under Articles 6, 12, and 17
is at issue, suspension of eligibility results. Id. § XV(4).
251.
Id. § XV(5). Emissions trading eligibility can be reinstated if the compliance plan
demonstrates that the party concerned will be able to meet its emissions limit in the next
commitment period. Id. §§ X(3)-(4).
252.
Id. § XV(8).
253.
Wiser, supra note 63, at 86-88. See also Matthew Vespa, Annual Review of Environment and Natural Resources Law: Climate Change 2001: Kyoto at Bonn and Marrakech,
29 ECOLOGY L.Q. 395, 413 (2002).
254.
A BriefAnalysis of COP-7, 12 EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULL., Nov. 12, 2001, at 15
(Int'l Inst. for Sustainable Development), available at http://www.iisd.ca/linkages/download/
pdf/enb12189e.pdf.
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cost to any individual party of initiating an enforcement action. Although
individual parties or an expert review team will need to trigger the process, the enforcement branch will bear the cost of pursuing these issues.
Furthermore, the structure of the branch will reduce the likelihood that
political manipulation and expediency will be a significant factor in its
decisions. Members of the branch will serve in an independent capacity.
The membership of the enforcement branch explicitly anticipates inclusion of an individual from small island nations, whose stake in the
effective operation of the Protocol is greatest. Noncompliance penalties
are applied automatically and are mostly predetermined. NGOs may
provide input into the process. Both the branch's determination and the
information submitted to it are made available to the public, increasing
transparency. 255 One commentator has gone so far as to claim the mechanism functions "much like a court. 256 In short, the incentive to forego
enforcement for the sake of political expediency will be minimal. Finally, the substantial and fixed size of the Annex B noncompliance
sanction-thirty percent of excess emissions-will give the process a
significant punitive element.257 It will create a greater incentive to trigger
enforcement actions, because the sanction will be more certain and coercive and, hence, more effective. Compliance hopefully will be the
preferred response.
The biggest question that remains, however, is whether the penalties
will be sufficient to alter the incentives for strategic behavior so that initiation of enforcement becomes attractive. Financial penalties, though
proposed, were not incorporated into the mechanism. Reinstatement of
eligibility for emissions trading appears relatively easy. Even the thirty
percent excess emissions penalty is likely to have only limited effect
since Article 18 stipulates that any procedures that entail binding consequences are subject to adoption by the amendment process. Refusal to
ratify such an amendment or even to participate in the subsequent commitment period could open a back-door escape from penalties.
Delaying application of penalties until the following commitment
period poses two additional problems. First, since each party's GHG
emissions reductions for the subsequent commitment period have not
been determined, the severity of the penalties can be blunted by manipulating the future assigned amounts. Second, given that the commitment
period lasts five years, delays may also reduce the political accountabil255.
Decision 24/CP.7, supra note 229, §§ VIII(4), VIII(6).
256.
Wiser, supra note 63, at 86. A more appropriate characterization may be an administrative tribunal, as the enforcement officer and the adjudicator are ultimately controlled,
albeit only to a limited extent, by the same superior officials-the Meeting of the Parties.
In addition to simple deterrence, the penalty may be viewed as a type of liquidated
257.
damage that addresses difficult-to-measure costs of noncompliance.

Summer 2006]

InternationalTreaty Enforcement

1181

ity of government officials responsible for noncompliance. Willful ignorance or acceptance of noncompliance may be a possibility.
The most significant threat to systematic application of the enforcement process, however, remains manipulation via implicit or explicit
threats of treaty denunciation. If denunciation is perceived as potentially
causing significant disruptions, even the independence of the enforcement
branch might not protect against a determination that nonenforcement
would ultimately be in the best interest of the institution.
2. Second Order Collective Action
To some extent, the form of the sanctions helps to overcome the second-order nature of the collective action problem. Suspension of the
right to engage in emissions trading and the thirty percent penalty take
advantage of processes that already exist within the Kyoto Protocol's
administrative structure. Other parties will not need to marshal new cooperative efforts or resources for implementation. Instead, emissions
accounting and trading processes are adjusted to reflect additional emissions reduction obligations or ineligibility to trade.
Unfortunately, the sanctions themselves do not become binding until
the Kyoto Protocol is amended and ratified, and they will not apply until
the subsequent commitment period. The trading suspension appears to
be easily reversible, and the longer the parties wait to proceed with the
amendment and ratification process, the more likely it is that some parties will know in advance the cost of compliance. Such parties may come
to see opposition to amendment of the Protocol as in their best interest.
3. Norms and the Rule of Law
The noncompliance mechanism incorporates a number of features to
promote treaty norms and the rule of law. The explicit requirement that
any implementation question be supported by sufficient evidence, "based
on the requirements of the Protocol," and "not ...ill-founded, '"2 will
ensure that the enforcement mechanism adhere closely to the treaty's
substantive goals and values. Handling de minimis violations by preliminary examination also eliminates nuisance actions and abuse of the
enforcement process for harassment purposes, thus minimizing misuse
of the noncompliance mechanism.
The automatic application of punitive consequences upon a noncompliance finding and limitation of appeals to due process issues
reduce uncertainty about the duty to comply. At the same time, reference
to due process,25 9 and the requirement that decisions be supported by
258.
259.

Decision 24/CP.7, supra note 229, § VII(2).
Id. § XI(1).
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conclusions and reasons, promotes legitimacy and fairness of the enforcement action.2' 6 The overall effect is to increase the transparency of
the enforcement process and reduce the risk of arbitrary or politically
motivated decisions.
Opportunities to manipulate or avoid application of treaty norms,
however, potentially undermine implementation. Sanctions do not become binding until the Kyoto Protocol is amended, and the enforcement
of such amendments is delayed until the following commitment period.
Only the target of enforcement has the right to appeal an adverse decision of the Compliance Committee,"' making it impossible to correct
misapplications of treaty norms if they result in nonenforcement. While
the use of a criminal due process and double jeopardy model is favorable
to the enforcement target, its appropriateness here seems dubious.
The noncompliance mechanism also does not elaborate on the meaning of the de minimis threshold or the content of the due process
requirement. Does de minimis designate an absolute quantity or a percentage fraction? Would the comparison standard be the party's total
assigned amount of emissions or only the emissions reductions (or increases) inscribed in Annex B? Even if developing countries are
exempted for the time being, the GHG emissions among individual Annex B states, such as the United States and Monaco, can vary by several
orders of magnitude. A fixed threshold that is reasonable for Monaco
will be meaningless to the United States, and vice versa.
The imprecision of the due process requirement poses even greater
problems. Due process can mean not only fair procedures but also substantive legal rights and defenses that may implicate principles of state
responsibility or excuses such as impossibility. Full application of the
poorly defined concept could upset expectations about the strictness of
Protocol requirements and the likely consequences of noncompliance.
Similarly, the noncompliance mechanism offers no guidance on how
threats of denunciation are to be handled in a principled and equitable
fashion.
Finally, the Protocol does not address how special circumstances or
other conditions-such as when a violation is minor but not de minimis--could justify a variance from the specified thirty percent sanction.
The mandatory nature of the penalty provisions seems to preclude that
possibility. Simply abolishing discretion in the penalty assessment process, however, does not guarantee that discretion will be eliminated. As
the federal experience with criminal sentencing guidelines indicates, discretion simply appears in other areas. The question is not whether the
260.
261.

Id. §§ IX(5), IX(9).
Id. § XI(1).
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legal process will accommodate the need for fairness in imposing sanctions, but rather how it will do so. The appropriate application of
enforcement discretion as a way of accommodating concerns about fairness, justice, or effective use of enforcement resources remains an
unresolved problem.
Ultimately, the noncompliance process has not adequately articulated how nonenforcement may be the legitimate and proper result of
discretionary judgments and legal excuse doctrines. Although strengthening sanctions processes is necessary, considerations of fairness cannot
be ignored. As legal norms, treaty provisions are authoritative but also
limited by other doctrines and equitable considerations in actual application.
C. The Underlying Problem of Treaty Design
The Kyoto Protocol's noncompliance mechanism represents a great
step forward. Other underlying problems of treaty design, however, will
impede the effectiveness of the sanctions process and the actual accomplishment of Protocol goals. The climate change treaties have been
modeled on the framework convention-protocol design of the ozone treaties.2 62 Like the Montreal Protocol, the Kyoto Protocol's primary
regulatory approach is to limit the atmospheric emissions by binding
263
numerical targets, the Annex B assigned amounts.
In adopting numerical targets, however, the Kyoto Protocol ignores
critical factors that differentiate it from the Montreal Protocol. Traditionally, the production of ozone depleting substances (ODS) took place in a
concentrated industry with only a handful of dominant manufacturers. The
phase-out schedules in the Montreal Protocol for the production of ozone
depleting substances2 were transparent and unambiguous in signaling to
these few industry actors that each of them had to phase out production.
Little was required by national governments to operationalize the Protocol's requirements.
Unfortunately, even though the Kyoto Protocol's Annex B limitations seem as deceptively simple and clear as the Montreal Protocol's
phase-out targets, the Annex B limitations differ in fundamental respects.
Unlike true emissions limitations of the type applied to particular
See, e.g., BENEDICK, supra note 63, at 320-30; VICTOR, supra note 27, at x-xi; De262.
velopments in the Law-International Environmental Law, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1484, 1542
(1991). See also BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 26, at 10.
See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 227, arts. 3(1), 3(7), Annex B.
263.
The Montreal Protocol limits both production and consumption of ozone depleting
264.
substances (ODS). However, consumption is calculated by adding production plus imports
minus exports. Consumption of ODS is thus directly correlated to production of ODS. See
Montreal Protocol, supra note 69, art. 3.

1184

Michigan Journalof InternationalLaw

[Vol. 27:1131

industrial polluters2 65 regulation of greenhouse gas emissions is in essence an attempt to control the varied uses of fossil fuel, including the
activities of power plants, the gamut of industrial users of oil products,
individuals using personal vehicles or heating homes, and the entire public transportation industry-in short, the activities of a country's entire
economy. The emissions limits thus require parties to restrict energy use,
change transportation policies, and address land use changes. They will
require large-scale changes to national economies and lifestyles and will
force governments to make complex choices and decisions about implementation.6 Like many other environmental agreements, the Kyoto
Protocol creates a mandate to regulate, with all its attendant difficulties.
To facilitate enforcement, the regulatory regime design will need to be
altered to focus more specifically on industries or particular activities
that contribute to GHG emissions. Continued insistence on wholesale,
generic regulatory mandates will present sustained enforcement difficulties.

CONCLUSION

Systematically triggering institutional deterrent sanctions in response to environmental treaty breaches remains a difficult problem. The
turn to alternatives in contemporary international practice has circumvented some of the difficulties, but these approaches include drawbacks,
and each by itself is unable to duplicate the instrumental and normative
functions of enforcement.
Understanding the public good characteristics of enforcement explains many of the difficulties inherent in enforcement and suggests
constructive improvements to environmental agreements. None of the
possible avenues is likely to be easy, but they all offer options that do not
require eschewing institutional deterrent sanctions. For those committed
to strong rule of law, these options also present the possibility that enforcement can make a greater contribution toward the development and
maturation of international environmental law.

265.
The problem of the Kyoto Protocol closely resembles the problem of regulatory
implementation of the hazardous air pollutants provisions of the Clean Air Act in the 1970s
and 1980s. See generally John Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY

L.Q. 233 (1990).
266.
See generally VICTOR, supra note 27.

